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Whither civil society in the Economic Partnership Agreements Negotiations?

Richard Kamidza

Trade and economic cooperation was a function of preferential tariffs under the Lome Conventions between the ACP and the EU countries. The new economic and trade co-operation under the Cotonou Agreement consist of a mélange set of arrangements that attempt to go beyond trade. This was perceived by many as having broadened the scope of engagement through the inclusion of non-state actors. If this was genuine, the non-state actors should have been involved when the Cotonou Agreement itself was being negotiated. Not to be included on the consequent Economic Partnership Agreements negotiations.

The Cotonou Agreement signed on the 23rd June 2000 belatedly provides a framework for involving non-state actors to actively participate in the formulation of co-operation policies and strategies, and their subsequent implementation. The aim is to establish mechanisms, which reconcile state responsibilities, and the recognition of the increasing role played by non-state actors in the development process. Increasingly, and over the years, non state actors have played a significant role in the development processes of countries particularly in the south, where they have filled in the gap created by the continued weakening of the state. The Seattle Debacle, where non state actors played a significant role in demanding the recognition of peoples’ rights over commercial interests, among other things, provided the much needed fuel and platform for them to get recognition from governments. It is not surprising though, that the Cotonou Agreement attempted to embrace civil society albeit at a later stage. Even the United Nations has now a desk for the participation of non-state actors particularly civil society on matters related to development. Proponents of neo-liberalism including the World Bank have also seen it necessary to include civil society in trade and development issues although this may be seen as text book engagements without practical democratic participation of the bodies in the formulation of policies for development. So the writers of the Cotonou Agreement had no choice but to also attempt to include non state actors in authoring and mentoring the exploitation of people in developing countries.

However, deep involvement and wide consultations of civil society remains a complex issue largely because of different situations in the ACP countries. Fundraising difficulties and tight conditions linked to EU money is another limiting factor that is prevalent in the six ACP-EPA regions. Having observed the above limitations, the ACP Secretariat promised to organize private sector and civil society fora designed to elicit useful reflections from them, which feed into the bilateral trade negotiations. However, the ACP Secretariat’s promise remains a pipe dream. In addition the ACP leadership during the launch of EPA configurations expressed strong desire to involve non-state actors in bilateral trade negotiations. The promise was well demonstrated by all the six EPA configuration road maps whose central thesis was “wide consultations and involvement in the new trade pact”.

State of play at the ESA Configuration

In the spirit of the Cotonou Agreement, the Eastern and Southern African (ESA) configuration has since its launch in February 2004 (Mauritius) pronounced its eagerness to involve national and regional civic bodies in the on-going process. ESA-EPA road map has established national and regional structures whose mandate is to develop negotiating positions to engage with the EU. As such, each country has to establish the National Development Trade Policy Forum (NDTPF) comprising government and non-state actors. This structure is supposed to facilitate wider consultations among all stakeholders as well as guide the process of developing national positions before tabling them at the Regional Negotiating Forum (RNF). At each RNF meeting, every country is mandated to submit progress reports that reflect activities being implemented and the level of consultations. However, this assumption forgets that some countries still lack the democratic space that allows civic bodies to participate in this process while others have not only weak, but underdeveloped non-state actors. Even in those countries where say private sector and other socio-economic actors are relatively developed, the level of ignorance at the membership level about this bilateral trade engagement is prevalent.

At the regional level, ESA-EPA negotiations provide space for one regional civic body to be involved. The Southern and Eastern African Trade Information and Negotiations Institute (SEATINI) has been invited as the only civic body to input into the negotiations process and working as a link to other civil society organizations. SEATINI has been contributing to the process and is the only civic body participating in the Regional Negotiations Forum (RNF) meetings that has got speaking rights. In addition, the organization has developed mechanisms for informing its strategic partners about the balance of forces and content of discussions at the RNF. But SEATINI’s lone voice so far justifies the call for investing in building capacity and networking among national and regional non-state actors as well as mounting negotiations training skills that target government trade negotiators. This also calls for running workshops and seminars for Members of Parliament (MPs), especially those dealing with trade protocols at the national and sub-regional levels. All the outlined programme activities seek not only to address the prevailing limited democratic space in some member-states, but also create conditions for cross fertilization of knowledge and ideas on trade bilateralism.

Despite all the above pitfalls and weaknesses, are there lessons to learn with the view to support the Cotonou Agreement framework of “wide consultations and involvement of non-state actors”?

What are SEATINI’s observations?

From all the ESA-EPA meetings held so far (Consultative Working Group meeting held in Lusaka; RNF meeting in Mombasa; and RNF meeting in Entebbe), the discussions still lack the requisite socio-economic and political analysis of the sub-regional challenges and dynamics this process is facing within the ESA configuration. This is worsened by little scrutiny from member-states coupled with their seemingly passive attitude that result in surrendering the whole process to the coordinating regional secretariat – the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA). In addition, the dangling of developmental aid by EU has triggered fast emotions by each configuration to rush the process so as to be the first in concluding an EPA. While the ESA configuration has so far dwelt on procedural matters, their counterparts in the EU, have already developed firm positions for negotiations.

All country delegates have failed to submit written progress reports as mandated by the ESA-EPA road map. Instead, only verbal country briefings without any substantial data have replaced traceable and documented reports. This not only undermines the NDTPF mandate, but also becomes a fertile ground for giving false impressions of what is happening at the respective country level. As a result, some countries end up misleading the RNF by reporting activities and programmes that are not shared at the NDTPF including the status of National Assessment studies and wide consultations and involvement of non-state actors.

In many countries, the necessary broad consultations as required by the ESA-EPA road map are not yet there. Even in those member-states with viable private sector, the knowledge of the on-going process is restricted to the secretariat. The membership is still in dark. The media is not helping either. Despite this serious weakness, verbal reports by many country delegates are silent on “wide consultation and involvement” of non-state actors. Obviously, respective country delegates cannot embarrass themselves in front of their peers, a development that endorses a process of minimal involvement of non-state actors in the on-going bilateral trade negotiations.

In many countries including those which hosted the RNF meetings, the level of publicity of this process leaves a lot to be desired. For instance, the Entebbe (Uganda) RNF meeting was not well covered in the media (both print and electronic). In many ESA countries, there are insignificant debates in the media coupled with total absence of public platforms to debate the EPA negotiations. Thus, the level of awareness raising in many ESA countries remains very low, a development that is worsened by weak civil society coupled with governments’ desire to fast-track the process. There is scant scrutiny of the process from the ESA-member-states who are eager to access developmental aid from the EU. At least for now, the whole process in many countries lacks the requisite mobilization strategy while at the same time weak networking among stakeholders at both the national and regional (configuration) level is failing to halt the fast-moving EPA juggernaut.

The above therefore indicates clearly that the process lacks the critical voice of non-state actors, particularly that of civil society movement. The process till lacks the ability to co-ordinate and organize workshops and seminars whose throughput contributes positively to RNF deliberations. So far, very few countries have an organized civil society that is participating at the NDTPF. However, there is much knowledge of the process from regional civic bodies, which have expressed readiness to assist in building capacity of other non-state actors. As argued before, some countries still lack democratic space to engage freely in this process. But there are also other regions such as the East African Community (EAC) where efforts to harness civil society participation are bearing fruit.

The above shows that countries are far apart in terms of engagement in the process. While few are focusing on issues, the majority are either focusing on broad political relations and/or imperatives with the EU, or are still appreciating this process. Some member-states lack capacity to prepare for these negotiations as public officials keep on alternating from meeting to meeting. Indeed, many countries suffer from lack of institutional memory as constant rotation of staff to these important meetings defeats this purpose.

There is high propensity by countries to look to the EU for support on every aspect of this process. This is despite the cry against delays in disbursement of funds (for research and publicity) and widespread unhappiness about the quality and focus of National Assessment studies done by consultants selected by EU, usually from the North and other sub-regions. Common complaints include failure by the consultants to include national elements in the studies, short time given to consultants (mostly done within a month), failure to involve national academics in the studies and weak and/or limited consultation of all stakeholders.

There are 12 countries, which are LDCs out of the total 16 member states of the ESA-EPA configuration. There is suspicion by some countries within the ESA configuration, especially small economies that feel that they are being taken for a ride to support four non-LDCs member-states. Already, the 12 LDCs have access to the EU market through the “everything, but arms” initiative. This means that these countries have little to gain, but plenty to lose if the EPAs outcome involve reciprocity. At least for now, these 12 countries believe that the EU need not and should not impose reciprocity to the existing trade arrangement.

Conclusion

While the Cotonou Agreement framework attempted to broaden non-state actors participation, the above analysis shows some serious weaknesses. Besides the dominance of the EU through various funding procedures and the passive attitude of governments, the regional coordinating secretariat has until now remained blind to the need to invest more in building capacity among the civic bodies, a process that assists in widening consultations. At the same time, developing positions suffer from low broad participation at both the national and regional levels. There are very few countries that have solid national structures capable of developing both offensive and defensive positions. To date, a significant number of member-states are still putting the tools of analysis in place, a development that is further worsened by failure to complete the studies in time. Expectations are therefore high for the forthcoming Madagascar RNF meeting to begin to see countries submitting their positions on key issues, a process that feeds into the regional front. Already, individual countries in the EU have already finalized their long list of positions, and are likely to accelerate the process. At the same time, the regional secretariat is yet to intensify training activities as well as supporting workshops and seminars designed to equip country negotiators with knowledge to assist in this process.

There are no adequate checks and balance mechanisms since there is no wide consultation in the process. This is the area where urgent solutions are needed in terms of coordinating strategies that minimize the negative outcome from this process. Any poor deal (bad EPA outcome) as a result of a flawed process only increases the profit margins of EU exporters rather than lowering prices to consumers and ESA importers. Failure to clearly articulate offensive and defensive interests results in sharp falls in customs duty revenues leading to low socio-economic development and political instability.

Coordination of strategies at the ESA region is very crucial, especially between authorities and ambassadors as well as among all the stakeholders including governments and the regional secretariat.

Richard Kamidza is SEATINI’s Programmes Co-ordinator
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Between a rock and a hard place
Africa faces no-win situation in trade deal with Europe

Nancy Kachingwe

Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, industrialized countries have been busying themselves with the re-organisation of international trade regimes. Included in this globalisation mission is the setting of trade deals between themselves and developing countries. Supposedly all this to-do about trade is about lifting the poorest of the poor out of their misery. Increased trade liberalization, it is said, will provide opportunities for developing countries to boost export earnings. The Doha Development Round within the WTO is supposed to work towards this goal.

Offers of increased market access to the lucrative markets in industrialized countries have been packaged in the form of the US Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and the European Union’s Cotonou Agreement and NAFTA. Unfortunately, all this generosity has a price attached to it, in the form of policy conditionalities on signatory countries to liberalise, privatize and deregulate in the name of attracting investment and facilitating increased business activity. In September 2002, trade ministers from the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific Group met their counterparts from the European Union to start negotiations for a new trade deal. The negotiations have already started with the establishment of free trade areas or “Economic Partnership Agreements” that constitute the new framework for trade relations between countries and sub-regions of the ACP.

Why the need for a new trade deal?

Previously, exports from the ACP countries entered the European Union market through the Lome Conventions – a series of agreement dating back to 1975. In 1994, following a trade dispute between the US and the EU over banana exports from the Caribbean, the WTO ruled that the Lome Convention gave ACP countries an unfair trade advantage over other WTO members and therefore violated WTO rules. There are various legal and developmental arguments around that particular WTO ruling, particularly given that the WTO rules make provision for special and differential treatment for developing countries. In the event, ACP countries were faced with two options. Under the first option, ACP countries could choose to abandon the Lome Convention arrangements and export under the EU’s General System of Preferences (GSP).

This option would mean less generous treatment for ACP exports, and therefore a potential loss of export earnings for these countries as their products would become less competitive. Given that the EU is one of the top destinations for ACP exports, losing market share would have fairly serious economic consequences on key export sectors. However, access to EU markets through the General System of Preferences is on a non-reciprocal basis, and therefore the GSP would continue to allow local ACP markets some protection from subsidized EU exports.

Introducing Economic Partnership Agreements

Option 2 involved setting up a free trade area (FTA) with the European Union, euphemistically dubbed “Economic Partnership Agreements” (EPAs). Under this option, ACP exports would enjoy the same preferences as before, BUT, unlike the Lome Conventions or the GSP, ACP countries would have to reciprocate, meaning that they would have to allow virtually unrestricted access to their markets for almost all EU products within a ten year transition period. The danger in the EPA proposal lies principally in the fact that local producers, manufacturers, and service providers, already battered and weakened from Structural Adjustment, would have to face competition from a flood of European imports and companies. The EPA/FTA model is one that the EU is pursuing under various names as part of its global trade strategy to create more trade and export opportunities for European companies worldwide. The European Commission, which negotiates on behalf of all the EU member states has been mandated to negotiate free trade areas with the ACP States. The EU argues that EPAs are the only possible option, if the ACP wish to both maintain the existing market access arrangements and comply with the WTO rules,. It is also argued by the EU that the EPAs are the best option for “integrating ACP countries into the global economy”.

Free trade areas: a disaster for developing countries

From the outset of the negotiations, the ACP countries have found themselves between a rock and a hard place. Basic economics tells us that free trade areas between highly industrialized, rich regions and economically underdeveloped poor countries will tend to disproportionately favour the economically strong, unless very specific measures are taken to ensure balanced benefits. Certainly this has been validated by assessments of the losses and gains following the entry into force of various WTO agreements. In addition to tariff reduction, the EU is demanding that the ACP agree to policy changes that are similar to its highly controversial proposals within the WTO. An example in the negotiating mandate is the EU proposals in relation to services liberalization. The EU’s strategy is to ensure that what it might not get in the WTO negotiations, it can try to secure through bilateral deals with countries and regions, such as EPAs. Furthermore, if the ACP agree to certain proposals in the EPA negotiations, the EU’s hand in the WTO negotiations would be considerably strengthened.

As is the case in the WTO where the new round of negotiations has been called the “development round”, there is an attempt to disguise purely mercantilist interests as development. It is (vaguely) said that EPAs will result in increased flows of foreign direct investment and technology transfers and there is an unspecified promise of better market access to the EU. In fact, whereas policy makers have been unable to make any convincing arguments about the benefits of EPAs, there is no doubt about the negative impacts of EPAs on ACP economies.

EPAs : brave new world or history repeated?

When the EPA option was first tabled by the EU in the Cotonou negotiations, ACP countries put up strong resistance to the proposal because of the many problematic implications for their economies. Rather than agree outright to EPAs as the framework for the trade negotiations, they argued for “alternative trade arrangements” which would comply with WTO rules – while stressing that certain WTO rules should be reviewed in those areas which present difficulties for developing countries. The expectation on the ACP side is that the EU and the ACP Group should use their numbers (soon to be over 100 countries) in the WTO to make a case for greater consideration of developing country needs in the international trade regime.

The EU is one of the key players in charting the direction of the WTO. Within the WTO, it has become clear that the EU is more preoccupied with pushing the concerns of big business (ie. accessing markets in other regions) than seriously addressing development questions. The main reason why EPAs – as envisaged in the EU negotiating mandate – can never work for the ACP countries is because they are geared towards meeting the EU’s external trade agenda to expand its share of markets throughout the world. There is a clear coherence and consistency between what the EU advocates in the WTO and what it is advocating in EPAs.

As a result, it is not surprising that the EU’s negotiating proposal envisages a situation where ACP countries lift all restrictions to European exports to the ACP regions, and where EU companies would be able to establish themselves and do business freely in ACP countries. The negotiating proposals do not make any mention of the EU’s (highly costly) protectionist policies such as the notorious Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), and its own unfair trade practices (eg. dumping). The EU mandate is above all not about sharing and caring – it is about economic expansion and domination. A brave new world indeed.

EPAs: a reality check

If the EPA proposal is bad enough, what is even worse is the extent to which it has gained acceptability. But it is worthwhile reminding ourselves in plain language of exactly what EPAs – under the current EU proposals - would mean.

• significant declines in government revenue as a result of the elimination of import taxes on EU goods. This will result in less budget funding for social and human development and would probably also result in higher tax burdens for citizens (eg. sales taxes) in order for governments to make up for lost revenue. The EU has already stated that it is not prepared to discuss new debt cancellation initiatives, as a way of compensating for these revenue losses.
• closures of local manufacturing ventures, especially SMEs as a result of competition from cheap subsidized imports. We are likely to see increased job losses, unemployment, poverty and loss of livelihoods. Industrialisation strategies to diversify and expand economic production would also be undermined because of the difficulties for new entrants to the market to compete.

• delivery of basic social services in the hands of non-national private sector operators as a result of selling off of essential public services to European transnational corporations under privatization agreements: the provision of health, education, and other basic social services will only be available to those who can pay for them. Low income groups will have less access to fewer basic social services.

• declines in inter-regional trade as a result of “trade diversion”: countries of the region will lose their markets in neighbouring countries. Instead of regional cooperation, there will be increased competition between countries of the region to attract “investment” from the EU.

• opening up to European competition for all government tenders: local companies who derive their income from government contracts (supplies, services etc) will have to compete with EU companies in bids and profits from these transactions will be repatriated as a result of “investment protection” deals.

• dumping of cheap EU agricultural surpluses (dairy products, cereals, beef etc): will threaten the viability of agriculture and agri-processing industries, particularly for small scale farming sector which does not receive state support. The result will be the collapse of the rural economies, and increased impoverishment and food insecurity particularly amongst women who are the backbone of the agricultural sector.

• losses and collapse of local retail sectors in both goods and services because of the entry into the market of European operators. The small and medium sized businesses, where the majority of formal sector workers are employed will be the most vulnerable because it is easy to undercut them. Local economic actors, particularly SME’s and women will be pushed to the margins as informal sector operators.

• investment measures that prohibit restrictions on repatriation of profits will result in continued capital flight from ACP economies. Government would not be able to give different treatment to local entrepreneurs as a means of supporting them to survive competition. There is likely to be increasing resentment towards Europeans and European businesses who will be seen as being treated more favourably and dominating local economies. Social tensions and political conflict will increase, because of widening class divisions between the haves and have nots as wealthy local elites remain the sole local beneficiaries from liberalization.

• dispossession of indigenous land owners and lost livelihoods to give way to operations such as European tourism and mining “investors.”

ACP countries have all experienced these impacts to a greater or lesser extent as a result of trade liberalization and deregulation. The human cost has been immeasurable. EPAs are clearly not designed to reverse these impacts – rather they will exacerbate them.

Is there a way out?

In EU-ACP policy making circles, the debate on EPAs is currently about damage limitation; in other words, how to ensure that the ACP will not lose out completely from a free trade area/EPA arrangement. But the trade liberalization / WTO experiences to date beg the question: should the ACP be negotiating EPAs at all? While trade preferences have done some good for ACP countries, the economic relationship between Europe and the ACP remains characterized by a very high level of dependency of ACP countries on European markets. The ACP countries have identified a fairly sound set of objectives as the basis for a trade agenda. It would be nothing short of a miracle if these objectives could be met through a free trade area with such an economically powerful partner, who to all appearances, is particularly unsympathetic to their special circumstances?

Policy documents that have been developed within the OAU/AU for example have stressed that the economic transformation and self-reliant development sought by the ACP depend on strengthening economic ties and trade between African countries and regions. Unfortunately, initiatives like the EPAs and AGOA continue to entrench unequal relations with industrialised nations always taking precedence over regional initiatives like the Africa Economic Community plan that was signed by heads of state in the late nineties. The result is ever increasing dependency on rich countries – for aid, trade and investment.

The ACP, it would seem, are obliged to enter into these negotiations because of pressure from the EU and the WTO, not because they ever felt that these negotiations were needed or in their interests. In fact the ACP Group had actually identified the status quo (Lome trade arrangements) as the ideal option. The timelines for completing the negotiations are determined by imperatives set by the WTO (ten years); they have nothing to do with the complex circumstances of different ACP countries and sub-regions. The need to negotiate in fact stems from the fact that the ACP are dependent on the EU for their export earnings, which in many cases are the result of preferential treatment that is accorded to them. But now the EU is exacting a heavy price to maintain these preferences – a price which the ACP can ill afford to pay. This is what is referred to as “adjustment costs” of EPAs, which have to be borne by the entire society.

The challenge for the ACP is not only to reduce dependency on the export of primary products to the EU. It is to reduce dependency on the EU altogether. Certainly, losing the EU’s preferential trade concessions would also entail adjustment costs.

What governments have to explain to their citizens is why and how the “adjustment costs” of an EPA are less than the “adjustment cost” of losing the special trade preferences. After all it has been rightly argued that countries in Asia which had similar levels of development as ACP countries at independence have now become economic tigers – without any special preferences from the EU.

Social movements from all sides have taken the position that within the WTO, there should be no new round of negotiations until the WTO was reformed and development issues were taken on board the WTO agenda more seriously. The reason for this position is that it is overwhelmingly clear that developing countries have very little power to influence the overall outcome of negotiations.

The same reasoning should apply to EPA negotiations. Why negotiate a liberalization agreement with the EU, until it has made commitments to reform its own trade policies and practices towards developing countries? Or until it has agreed to support debt cancellation? Or until it has agreed to substantially increase aid towards ACP economic revival?

ACP governments – individually or collectively - do have the option to simply throw out the EPA proposal and look for more viable options to deal with the economic challenges in their countries, as well as a hostile global environment. It is not an easy challenge, but the alternative is even less attractive.

Issues for civil society: is another world possible?

Civil society and social movements have for too long been neglecting issues of multilateral trade. They have a duty to sound the alarm bell when in international arena, their governments are being pressured or enticed into agreements that are not in the national interest. They also have a responsibility to push governments to address structural inequities and inequalities between North and South in multilateral fora. Not enough pressure is being put on governments to take a firm stand against ill conceived initiatives coming from the North.

The ACP Negotiating Guidelines clearly state that “EPAs will have to establish legitimacy in ACP states, particularly as regards their contribution to sustainable development of those countries.” It calls for the involvement of all stakeholders in the negotiations process, public scrutiny of the negotiations including parliamentary follow ups, and inclusive and transparent negotiations process. But the stakeholders can not be involved if they are not up to speed on and informed on the issues.

The EPA negotiations are not simply an obscure diplomatic exercise. They are about lives, livelihoods and our regions’ economic prospects. The idea of setting up free trade areas with the European Union under the current circumstances is - to put it bluntly - foolhardy. In matters of trade, the EU’s indifference and insensitivity to the needs of developing countries makes the whole idea of partnership a ludicrous joke. It should be inconceivable that the EU can so ruthlessly exploit its position of influence to make demands of countries where people live on less than a euro a day simply to further the interests of its multi-billionaire corporations. This is what is happening and there should be a public outcry against it.

If the general public in ACP countries were properly informed about the issues in the negotiations, and they had a choice to accept or reject free trade areas with Europe, there is a strong likelihood that they would reject EPAs. After all, why is it that only the ACP have to face “adjustment costs” while the EU barely needs to give such problems a second thought? Foreign aid notwithstanding, the perception of the public – and rightly so – is that developing countries get a raw deal from the North. The hype about free trade and globalisation being good for development is simply yet another example of double standards and hypocrisy that the rich countries are becoming more, rather than less famous for in their dealings with there poorer countries.

Maybe it is about time we just said “no.” And NO to EPAs is the ay forward.

This is an abridged version of the article that first appeared as the Mwengo EPP Feature Series no 1 in 2003. It is hereby reproduced with their kind permission. At the time Nancy Kachingwe was the Programme Officer at MWENGO, a reflection and development centre for NGOs in East and Southern Africa.
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Editorial: EPAS: A ‘Partnership’ Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea

Chandrakant Patel

The launch of the “Economic Partnership Agreements” between the EU and the ACP countries represents yet another setback to Africa’s aspirations to develop and free itself from the shackles of uneven trade. Since the core objective of the EPAS is to introduce reciprocal trade between uneven ‘partners’, it is inevitable that the EU will secure further inroads into the ACP’s goods, services and investment markets. A close examination of ACP countries export performance in the EU markets over the past two decades (when they enjoyed non-reciprocal access under various ACP/Lome schemes and GSP) reveals that their market shares have fallen dramatically, nullifying any advantage they may have enjoyed on account of these special arrangements. The reasons for this are many but they principally revolve around the near-complete absence of domestic supply capabilities to benefit from the EU/Lome preferences. The policies needed to strengthen domestic supply capacity and compete globally such as incentives through targeted protection for local investment and production -are the very policies and options being given up under the EPAS arrangements.

While the EUs strategy is clear, it is hard to discern any on the part of the ACP. For the EU, EPAS are part of multi-pronged strategy to pry open ACP markets. This includes an aggressive stance in the WTO complemented by EPAS, bilateral trade negotiations, bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and the instrumentalities of Bank-Fund lending to ensure liberalisation and enhanced access for EUs investors and exporters.

The real question is: why and how did the ACO countries acquiesce in this process and why should one believe that the process can be influenced through, for example, civil society’s participation in the many committees and task forces established, belatedly to be sure, by the EU.

Richard Kamidza draws attention to the myriad difficulties the civil society faces in making effective contribution to the EU-designed and funded process for consultation. But a more fundamental question, raised by Nancy Kachingwe is: should the ACP be negotiating EPAS at all? Experience with Uruguay Round (and now, the Doha Round) suggests that once a flawed and biased agenda is agreed to and processes set in motion to meet the deadlines, developing countries have very little, if any, leverage to influence the outcome. The choice facing them is unenviable: to scuttle the process and face concerted financial and trade retaliation or agree to negotiate and secure chimeral gains but in reality immiserise their economies through uneven outcomes.

Instead of seeking greater participation and involvement, largely of a cosmetic variety, should not the civil society reject any involvement in the EPAS process and instead urge our Governments to reevaluate the fundamental premises of EPAS? Economic groupings imposed from outside are likely to go the same way as the many colonial inspired free trade arrangements (such as, for example, the erstwhile East African Common Market) which were designed to benefit the colonial commercial interests. By calling such externally conceived arrangements ‘partnerships’, are we not risking further economic and social regression?

Chandrakant Patel represents SEATINI in Geneva and is editor of the SEATINI Bulletin.