SEATINI BULLETIN

Southern and Eastern African Trade,

Information and Negotiations Initiative

 

Strengthening Africa in World Trade

Volume 4, No. 09 & 10 Produced by theInternational South Group Network 15 & 30 May  2001
 
 

Trade: Don't Expand Trade System to New Issues, advises RicuperoThird World Network (TWN)

Jubilee South Pan-African Declaration on PRSPs Kampala, 10-12 may 2001

Director's Comment: The Third LDCs Conference: Deliverables or Deliverance?


Trade: Don't Expand Trade System to New Issues, advises Ricupero
Jakarta, 29 May (TWN)

New trade negotiations should not repeat the mistakes of the Uruguay Round and should not further limit the space of developing countries for policy options but should focus on real trade issues of concern to developing countries, especially the implementation problems. Therefore, Members of the World Trade Organization should not try to expand the frontiers of the trade system to new and controversial issues but instead go back to the basics of what the WTO was set up to do, namely, to provide trade opportunities to developing countries for trade. This was the central message of UNCTAD Secretary-General Rubens Ricupero in an address at the opening session of the meeting of the Trade and Economy Ministers of the Group of 15 (the Summit level Group of Developing Countries) held on Sunday [27 May 2001]. Other speakers in the panel were WTO deputy director general, Mr. Miguel Rodriguez Mendoza (who said the issue was no longer whether Doha would initiate new negotiations but what subjects to include in the agenda) and Third World Network director Martin Khor (who for his part argued that introducing new issues at Doha would mean asking developing countries to pay twice, thrice or four times in return for considering their requests on implementation.)

Referring to his own experience as a negotiator in the Uruguay Round, Ricupero, suggested that developing countries concentrate on trade negotiations that address matters of real concern to developing countries. "We should adapt the level of ambition of trade negotiations to what is feasible," he said. "When you discuss whether to accept or not accept negotiations on an issue, it is already an important negotiation. "What to accept on the agenda is a key decision. To agree to accept something on the agenda is already part of the negotiations and decisions...It is clear that the way you accept what is on the agenda when launching negotiations itself determines what outcome is reached." In that context, Ricupero advised developing countries to focus WTO's work on trade liberalisation issues, and "not try to expand the frontiers of the trade system to new and controversial issues, but go back to the basics of what the WTO is set up to do, and that is, to provide opportunities to developing countries for trade."

Earlier, Ricupero warned that in the present WTO negotiations, there should not be a repetition or continuation of the Uruguay Round, as the Round had been very ambitious (with 15 working groups) and it had also left a series of problems that had not been adequately addressed yet. "A continuation or repetition of the Uruguay Round is not desirable especially since deeper and wider obligations were imposed on developing countries and it has been the cause of problems burdening the system, for example the implementation problems in agreements such as TRIMS, TRIPS and subsidies.

"Developing countries don't wish to have the setting up of wider and deeper obligations that restrict their options for development policies. This is by no means an imaginary concern. Several developing countries have been brought to the dispute settlement system because of the conflict between their industrial and development policy on the one hand and the results of the Uruguay Round on the other. But today, six years after the Uruguay Round ended, "much of that unfinished business is still unfinished."

Although decisions were made in principle to liberalise agriculture in developed countries, in reality very little has happened. In textiles, decisions were implemented in letter but not in spirit and very little true liberalisation has happened until now. "It is not correct to argue that any meaningful progress in implementation can only take place in a comprehensive and enlarged Round," added Ricupero. "This is not true even in the WTO's practice. After the Uruguay Round, at least on three occasions, liberalisation took place outside a Round -- the Information Technology Agreement, and successful conclusions on basic telecommunications and financial services. All these three took place entirely outside of any link to a comprehensive Round, and they were mainly promoted by the developed countries. Thus the argument that nothing can be achieved outside a comprehensive negotiations cannot be supported by evidence. He added that there should also be discussion on measures to ensure the avoidance of a situation that developing countries have to negotiate under duress.

The WTO deputy director general, Miguel Mendoza said the WTO had achieved a lot to restore confidence after Seattle, including launching of agriculture and services negotiations, addressing developing countries' implementation concerns and more transparent and inclusive functioning of the WTO. Mendoza said the issue did not seem to be whether to initiate new negotiations at Doha but rather which subjects to include in the negotiating agenda. He added that developing countries were actively influencing the negotiating agenda and that they are convinced that only through trade negotiations can they open the markets of developed countries and other developing countries.

Third World Network director Martin Khor stressed that developing countries were being asked to pay not twice but three or four times for having their implementation issues considered. On arguments from developed countries and the WTO secretariat that developing countries would gain most from a New Round, Khor said "nothing could be further from the truth." He added the WTO was at a crossroads and decisions before and at Doha will affect the direction of the system.

"The most important decision is whether the next few years will see the WTO Members rectifying the problems and imbalances in the rules and system, or whether the proposal for a 'new comprehensive Round' is accepted, in which case more new issues are added to the WTO which will distort the trading system and add on even more to the existing imbalances."

Khor said the developed countries have not lived up to their liberalisation commitments, "yet they proclaim that it is
unquestionably beneficial for developing countries to liberalise as fast as possible." Developing countries are asked to bear for a little while the pain of rapid adjustment which is surely good for them after a few years, whereas the developed countries which advocate this policy themselves ask for more time to adjust in agriculture and textiles which have been protected for so many decades.

It is claimed by the proponents that such a New Round would be especially beneficial to developing countries. Nothing could be further from the truth. Developing countries are told their requests on implementation and on getting greater access in the North for agriculture and textiles will be considered in the New Round, meaning that they have to accept the entrance of the new issues into the WTO. But new agreements and obligations in these new areas would be very detrimental to developing countries, which will find even more of their development options closed off; and at the same time (given the poor record of the North in not keeping their commitments) there is no guarantee at all that the implementation problems will be resolved or that there will be really more meaningful access to Northern markets in agriculture, textiles and other sectors.

The WTO and its predecessor the GATT have evolved trade principles (such as non-discrimination, MFN and national treatment) that were derived in the context of trade in goods. It is by no means assured or agreed that the application of the same principles to areas outside of trade would lead to positive outcomes. Indeed, the incorporation of non-trade issues into the WTO system could distort the work of the WTO itself and the multilateral trading system. Therefore, a fundamental rethinking of the mandate and scope of the WTO is required, said Khor.

Firstly, issues that are not trade issues should not be introduced in the WTO as subjects for rules. This rule should apply at least until the question of the appropriateness and criteria of proposed issues is dealt with satisfactorily in a systemic manner. Secondly, a review should be made of the issues that are currently in the WTO to determine whether the WTO is the appropriate venue for them. Prominent trade economists such as Jagdish Bhagwati and Prof. Sreenivasan have concluded that it was a mistake to have incorporated intellectual property as an issue in the Uruguay Round and in the WTO.

There should be a serious consideration, starting with the mandated review process, of transferring the TRIPS Agreement from the WTO to a more suitable forum, Khor said.
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[Extracted from SUNS - South North Development Monitor #4905.]


Jubilee South Pan-African Declaration on PRSPs
Kampala, 10-12 may 2001

'Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers'
Structural Adjustment Programmes in Disguise

The World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) have produced their Poverty Reduction Strategy Programmes (PRSPs) within the context of corporate globalisation. This process is being driven by and for the giant transnational corporations (TNCs) and global financial forces. These utilise the economic, political and military powers of their governments, and the World Bank, IMF and World Trade Organisation (WTO) to impose policies on the South and to restructure and run the world to serve their interests.

These forces have led to the enrichment of the corporations and their 'share-holders', as well as small elites in the South - to the heavy cost of the vast majority of people of the world. The World Bank and IMF have found it necessary to impose PRSPs onto the most impoverished countries because the intertwined processes of enrichment and impoverishment have led to growing international resistance to the forces, aims and effects of globalisation.

Social organisations and popular movements across the world have come out against structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) in their various guises, particularly as based on the feminisation of adjustment to the further detriment of women and children. Our campaigns have exposed the use of debt as a deliberate mechanism utilised by the World Bank and IMF to enforce the implementation of ever harsher structural adjustment programmes that are wreaking havoc across the world.
As a result, the World Bank and IMF are facing a deepening crisis of legitimacy. Thus they have introduced PRSPs mainly as a public relations exercise to demonstrate a supposedly new-found concern for the poverty in the poorest countries of the South, and to prove that they have a genuine desire to see the people of these countries 'participating' in finding solutions to their poverty.

But we are not fooled! Our sharing of experiences over the days of this workshop have strengthened our common understandings. We are clear that the PRSPs represent nothing other than yet another attempt by the World Bank and the IMF to continue imposing their structural adjustment programmes on the people of our countries. In fact, the PRSPs will result in an even more comprehensive control by the IMF and World Bank - not only over financial and economic policies but over every aspect and detail of all our national policies and programmes. This will entrench the continuation of IMF and World Bank control over our countries, and contribute to the continuation of the global power relations, in which the rich overwhelmingly concentrated in the North dominate the South and the whole world.

In this context, and on the basis of the long, deep and painful experiences of SAPs in our countries, we reject:
· SAPs in any form or with any cosmetic 'adjustments';
· PRSPs as the latest version of structural adjustment;
· HIPC initiative as debt 'relief'
· All SAP-HIPC-PRSP conditionalities in order to be granted debt "relief";
· 'Relief' of only a portion of debt and continued repayment of the remaining debt which will simply ensure continued control and domination;
· Any attempt to use our organisations to legitimise structural adjustment, HIPCs, PRSPs or debt "relief"; and
· Any further role or interference of the World Bank or IMF in our countries.
· Any further loans to finance HIV-AIDS programmes which only serve to further indebt our countries, which increase our dependence on the institutional finance institutions, while millions of our people continue to suffer and die in the pandemic in our countries.

On the basis of our review in this workshop of a number of experiences of PRSPs in countries in Africa (and Latin America) and on the basis of in-depth analysis and wide-ranging discussion, we note that:
· PRSPs are located within the IMF and World Bank macro-economic framework and this is not open for debate. The poverty programmes are expected to be consistent with the neo-liberal paradigm including privatisation, deregulation, budgetary constraints and trade and financial liberalisation. Yet these have exacerbated economic and social crises in our countries.
· They focus only on internal factors and ignore the role of international/global factors and forces in creating economic crises and poverty in our countries.
· The only aspects of our realities that are open to consultation are those 'outside' the macro-economic realm, and even the realisation of these is actively contradicted by the requirements and constraints of the macro-economic prescriptions.
· The neo-liberal paradigm is also not acceptable because it fails to explicitly locate programmes to tackle poverty and subordination within effective gender equity perspectives and gender frameworks. Mere gender 'mainstreaming' is totally insufficient as a remedy.
· The World Bank and IMF are manouevering to regain their legitimacy by offering poverty 'reduction' and debt 'relief' whereas we demand full release from all debt bondage and the total eradication of poverty.
· These so-called poverty programmes have been imposed on countries in a manner which ignores and replaces existing anti-poverty and national development programmes. As such, they are an external intervention with little or no regard for national dynamics, and are an unacceptable intrusion . But they cannot easily be ignored given that countries have to implement these programmes as an additional conditionality even for the much criticised HIPC debt 'relief'.

The experiences of the functioning of PRSPs in our countries raise a number of additional concerns with regard to the involvement of organisations of civil society:
· The PRSPs are not based on real peoples participation and ownership, or decision-making. To the contrary, there is no intention of taking civil society perspectives seriously; but to keep participation to mere public relations legitimisation;
· The lack of genuine commitment to participation is further manifested in the failure to provide full and timeous access to all necessary information, limiting the capacity of civil society to make meaningful contributions.
· The PRSPs have been introduced according to pre-set external schedules which in most countries has resulted in an altogether inadequate time period for an effective participatory process.
· In addition to all the constraints placed on governments and civil society organisations in formulating PRSPs, the World Bank and IMF retain the right to veto the final programmes. This reflects the ultimate mockery of the threadbare claim that the PRSPs are based on 'national ownership'.
· An additional serious concern is the way in which PRSPs are being used by the World Bank and IMF, both directly and indirectly, to co-opt NGOs to 'monitor' their own governments on behalf of these institutions.

In some instances, notably in those countries in which governments have not been open to civil society participation or have not had poverty and development on the agenda for discussion, the PRSPs initially appeared to open up a space for civil society organisations to engage their governments. However, this has not achieved the desired effect of challenging structural adjustment. Furthermore, many organisations have invested so much energy in the PRSP processes that they have been distracted from their work in opposing SAPs and HIPCs and campaiging for debt cancellation. The lesson we have learnt is that we need to return to our own agendas and reinvigorate and further strengthen our engagement and work with people at the grassroots.

We as African civil society organisations need to:
· Continue and intensify our efforts to expose to the people in our countries, and the world, the inter-linked aims and effects of SAPs, HIPCs and PRSPs, and the strategic purposes of the World Bank and the IMF;
· Mobilise our people and link up with our allies in the South, and partners in the North, for immediate and total cancellation of our external debts without external conditionalities;
· Proactively engage with our governments on issues as determined by our agendas and on the basis of genuine participation and popular empowerment within our own societies, communities and cultures;
· Mobilise to encourage and push our governments to stand together and repudiate the debt;
· Mobilise our people to challenge and change the global economic system through campaigns and actions to shut down the World Bank and IMF and to stand up to other forces, including the WTO, Northern governments such as the EU (through the Cotonou Agreement) and the US (through AGOA), as well as their TNCs;
· Mobilise our peoples to oppose the ruling elites who are implementing structural adjustment programmes and further entrenching neo-liberal policies in our countries.
We call upon our peoples to develop further - and deepen through intensified analysis, discussion and full participation - our own democratic, people-centered, gender equitable and environmentally sustainable national, regional and continental alternatives as the basis for a united African challenge to the current oppressive, exploitative and destructive global system.

Participants

· African Organisation on Debt and Development (AFRODAD - Africa)
· African Women's Economic Policy Network (AWEPON)
· Africa Trade Network (Southern Africa)
· Alternative Information and Development Center (AIDC - South Africa)
· Associacao para Desenvolvimento Rural de Angola (ADRA - Angola)
· Asapsu - Cote d'Ivoire
· BEACON - Nairobi
· Botswana Council of Churches
· Catholic Commission for Justice & Peace (Malawi)
· Center for International Studies (CEI) (Nicaragua)
· CMID - Ghana
· CONGAD (Senegal)
· Divida (Mozambique Debt Group)
· Ecumenical Support Services for Economic Transformation (ESSET - South Africa)
· Fellowship of Christian Councils and Churches in the Great Lakes & Horn of Africa (FECCLAHA)
· Gender and Trade Network (Southern Africa)
· GERA
· Peace Humanius (Cameroon)
· International South Group Network (Southern Africa)
· Jubilee 2000 Angola
· Jubilee 2000 Cameroon
· Jubilee 2000 Nigeria
· Jubilee 2000 Senegal
· Jubilee 2000 Zambia and Civil Society for Poverty Reduction (Zambia)
· Jubilee South Africa
· Jubilee South (Africa)
· Karios EUROPA
· Kenya Debt Relief Network (KENDREN)
· Ledikasyon pu Travayer (Workers Education - Mauritius)
· Malawi Economic Justice Network (MEJN)
· Mwelekeo wa NGO (MWENGO - Southern Africa)
· Southern African Peoples Solidarity Network (SAPSN)
· South and East Africa Trade, Information and Negotiation Initiative (Seatini)
· Tanzania Coalition on Debt and Development
· Tanzania Gender Networking Programme
· T.E.I.A - Mozambique
· Uganda - ActionAid
· Uganda Joint Christian Council
· World Council of Churches
· Zimbabwe Coalition on Debt and Development (ZIMCODD - Zimbabwe)
· YWCA of Kenya
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Director's Comment: The Third LDCs Conference: Deliverables or Deliverance?

The third UN Conference on LDCs in Brussels from 14 - 20 May 2001, ended as expected: the adoption of a ten-year programme predictably christened the Brussels Declaration and Programme of Action. This programme of non-binding commitments by donors and their agencies­the multilateral institutions- promise to do more provided the LDCs behave according to donor-driven norms of good governance, liberalise their economies further and establish a policy framework friendly to foreign investment. The EU Commissioner and host of the Conference, sought to put a spin on the outcome, arguing that "the so-called deliverables had been delivered". Exactly what is being delivered, by who, why and for whose benefit is however far from clear.

After the exhortations of the two previous LDC Conferences-the so-called Paris Programmes of Action of 80s and the 90s,the Social Summit and the Millennium Summit one may be tempted a to ask, so what is new? Not much, apparently. The document contains a catalogue of promises-by donors and by LDCs- on ODA, on debt, on market access on governance and other areas of development policy. But in the context of withering and dis-empowered state apparatuses, what are the capacities of the LDCs to enforce the apparently well meaning commitments and ensure their implementation? The answer, surely , is none. One has to look no further than the resolutions and declarations adopted over the past few decades to conclude that these are not worth the paper they are written on.

Instead of articulating alternative development policies, the Conference appears to have further sanctified the strictures of the IMF/World Bank programmes of liberalisation, which have been among the key reasons accounting for the immiserisation of LDCs. In giving pride of place to the discredited Poverty Reduction Strategies engineered by the Bretton Woods bodies (see the Kampala PRSP declaration earlier in this issue), the Conference has given carte blanche to these institutions to continue to wreak havoc with dis-enfranchised populations of the LDCs. In undertaking vacuous commitments their real objective is to sweeten the bitter medicine of conditionalities, designed to ensure further market opening for foreign capital, goods, technologies and cultures.
This, then, is the real and far-reaching import of this Conference. The implicit sanction given by the Conference to "as usual "policies of the donors and their multilateral organisations will help ensure that the LDCs continue to languish under the weight of governance-oriented conditionalities.

Likewise, the much hyped 'Everything but Arms' (EBA) offer of the EU succeeded in softening the LDC negotiators and at the same time corralling their support for the launch of a new round in WTO. As has been pointed out in the last issue of the bulletin, this offer does not add to commitments existing under other schemes such as GSP, but in substance will remain ­ like the existing ones - meaningless. In the absence of parallel measures in areas such as rules of origin and the reform of a panoply of safeguard measures regularly invoked by developed countries, LDCs exports will continue to stagnate.

Parallel to the inter-governmental work of the Conference was the issue of follow-up to the recommendations of the Conference. For the delegations from New York and Geneva in particular, the bottom line of the Conference was indeed the very last paragraph of the Programme. This calls upon the Secretary General of the United Nations to consider establishing the post of a High Representative to deal with the LDCs issues in the United Nations. This decision is widely seen as a strong expression of lack of confidence in UNCTAD secretariats capacity to effectively address the LDC issue. Strenuous efforts to counter this proposal even at the risk of dividing the G-77 and the LDCs only helped strengthen the resolve of the LDCs to create a new institution in the UN system able and willing to tackle their problems. It remains to be seen, however, whether the creation of yet another High-level post will make a difference. The chances are that such a body will come a cropper so long as the commitments in the Programme are non-binding on the developed countries and fail to provide any sanction against non-implementation.
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Produced by the International South Group Network (ISGN) Director and Editor: Y. Tandon; Advisor on SEATINI: B. L. Das

Editorial Assistance: Helene Bank, Rosalina Muroyi and Raj Patel

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