A. Historical Background

A.1 Introduction

This is a report based on the effects of globalisation defined as opening up of domestic markets to international forces through trade liberalisation and privatisation on the livelihoods of the people in Lower Guruve (Dande), part of the Mid-Zambezi Valley over the past two decades. Before independence in 1980, the area was largely traditional due to its isolation and neglect. In terms of land use form, since the colonisation of Zimbabwe and the subsequent effective administration in the 1920s the area it had been reserved as a wildlife zone with safari areas carved up for commercial hunting.

Since independence, there have been rapid modifications to the original situation as the region was increasingly opened up to external modernising forces. However, no documentation and analysis has been done to find out the effects of these transformations on the livelihoods of the local people. Therefore the purpose of this paper is to analyse and document the effects that have taken place since independence.

B.0 Pre- Independence Period

At independence the area had a small population largely settled along the three main rivers flowing through the valley, Musengezi, Manyame and Angwa. The indigenous ethnic group were the Korekore a Shona sub-ethnic group. The population was estimated at around 7,000 households. The inhabitants grew sorghum, millet and groundnuts as summer crops and maize as a winter crop along the riverbanks. The inhabitants reared goats only, as the area was tsetse infested therefore prohibiting the rearing of cattle. Both business and social infrastructure were extremely underdeveloped.

As the remnant part of the Mutapa Empire, from the fifteenth to the eighteenth centuries, the state derived its wealth from three sources: cattle-herding on the plateau, agriculture and distant trade in ivory and gold . Highly profitable trade routes from the plateau to the seaports via the Zambezi River that passed through Dande flourished. In this way the area was linked to the international network of trade between Europe and the Far East. Ivory and gold were exchanged with Portuguese traders for cloth and beads from India. Salt extracted from saltpans was traded internally with the people of the plateau for grain.

The effects of the Pioneer Column that founded the state of Rhodesia in 1890 had hardly any effects on Lower Guruve for almost 20 years . Even the nationwide resistance of 1896-7 marginally affected the people of the Valley. At that time their focus was on resisting the Portuguese during the insurrections of 1905 and 1917. Eventually in 1920 the Rhodesian state made its presence felt through the reorganisation of chieftaincies, (demoting those found hostile and increasing the power of those found friendly) and the introduction of taxation. Headmen and chiefs were charged with the responsibility of collecting the imposed tax. The direction of trade and labour recruitment switched from its original northerly orientation in the direction of the established Portuguese trading posts (Tete and Sena) along the Zambezi River to a southerly course towards the farms and mines of the Plateau.

The early diversification of the local economy into various forms of trade had been spurred by the desire to seek additional sources of income not reliant on rains. The collapse of the Portuguese trade routes coincided with the imposition of taxation that drove young labour out of the local economy onto the capitalist market. The loss of the two main pillars of the inherently unstable local economy weakened it. The fate of the family livelihoods has become dependant on success of the male migrant labour on the plateau, and the production of cotton and maize. The original trade has been reduced to the sale of baskets and mats woven by men from the bamboo and river reeds.

C.0 Changes Taking Place

C.1 Sharp Population Increase

The population has since increased dramatically at different points in time due to several factors. Owing to its sparse population, a heavy influx of migrants occurred in the early 1980s. Intra-rural migration took place at that time as a response to the availability of virgin land in Lower Guruve. The migrants came from the districts of Masvingo and Manicaland provinces that were under intense land pressure. New villages sprang up due to this population increase. The process of migration accelerated towards the late 1980s when the Tsetse Eradication Programme, funded by the European Economic Community (EEC) cleared large areas of tsetse flies. The coming of outsiders into the valley has brought in ethnic tension into the region. Ethnic friction is sharp where it is accompanied by differences in the accumulation of material wealth.

During the mid-1980s, under the Mid-Zambezi Development Plan, initiated by the state and funded by the African Development Bank (ADB), the traditional villages were reorganised ostensibly on the grounds of facilitating the provision of services to the people. The implementation of the plan created space for more migrants to settle in the Valley. At that time more and more settlers were attracted by cotton production whose prospects appeared lucrative relative to other crops.

Since the implementation of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP), prescribed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as a condition to reinvigorate the economy in the early 90s, a significant number of workers were retrenched from mines, commercial farms and urban centres. The act was a process of de-industrialisation as the economy shrank resulting in the laying off workers. Some of these workers had no permanent residence on farms and mines. Inevitably, they sought refuge in the Valley. The majority are of foreign origin, having been recruited from neighbouring countries as young men during the colonial era, therefore without an immediate rural base in Zimbabwe . These former workers sought refuge in the relatively sparsely populated areas such as the valley.

Ever since the commencement of the agrarian reform that erupted in early 2000 after the constitutional referendum, there have been movements in and out of the Valley. A handful of farmers linked to the liberation war secured plots in the former commercial farms on the plateau, and decided to move out of Lower Guruve. Yet at the same time there was an opposite and massive movement into the valley by former commercial farm workers who had lost their farm jobs as a result of the reform. A 2003 study in five wards of Lower Guruve reported an unprecedented sharp population increase of 32% between 2001 and 2003 .

A summary of population figures for the period 1992 to the 2003 years is given in the table below.

Source: CSO Census figures, 2005
* 2003 figures are Christian Care estimates from the Food Distribution Program

The figures show that the population of Lower Guruve has doubled from 1992 to 2003. The increase is far more than the national rate of population growth. The reasons for the sharp increase have already been given in the text. Tsetse eradication, retrenchments and agrarian reform are the key reasons behind the sharp increase.

C.2 Shift from Food Crops to Cotton Production

Agricultural production underwent a swift transformation from food to cash crop production. Traditionally sorghum and millet were the staple food crops grown, but since the mid-80s small grains have to a large extent been replaced by cotton, a cash crop. Nearly all farmers at present grow cotton and the area under the crop is around 80% of the total arable land. The shift to cotton production has unwittingly exposed the people to the vagaries of the international market forces.

Levels of external input use (as opposed to local inputs in the traditional small grains production) expanded considerably, because cotton is an input intensive crop. Therefore companies such as Agricura (mobile) and the cotton merchants set up depots within the valley for the supply and distribution of agro-chemicals to farmers. The Cotton Marketing Board, the predecessor of Cotton Company of Zimbabwe, introduced an input credit support scheme in which cotton growers source inputs according to desired hectarage on credit, payable at the marketing stage. Furthermore, the then Agricultural Finance Corporation (now Agricultural Development Bank) began advancing input loans strictly for cotton production only. All these measures spurred cotton production in Lower Guruve since then to the present date.

With the huge increase in cotton production, marketing depots were set up at Mahuwe and Mushumbi during the early 1980s where growers make deliveries during the marketing season. Initially, the Cotton Marketing Board was the only player in the cotton-marketing sector. The marketing arrangement ensured guaranteed pre-planting prices, therefore farmers engaged in production with the full knowledge of what they expected to get from the planned produce. The agricultural business environment then was favourable with stable input and producer prices.

C.3 Switch to Mechanised Tillage

Parallel to the above developments were efforts of the state and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) that also appeared on the scene. The state through the District Development Fund (DDF), quasi-government organisation, began providing. mechanised tillage services to Lower Guruve in 1982. The services turned out to be inadequate in relation to demand. Lutheran World Federation (LWF) a non -governmental organisation appeared on the scene in 1984. It brought tractors to augment state services to ease the draught power shortage. At that time the residents could not rear cattle due to the scourge of tsetse flies. At its peak (1992. Lower Guruve Development Association( LGDA) the successor to the LWF tillage programme had a fleet of 8 tractors strategically deployed in the scattered villages of Lower Guruve to ensure equitable distribution of services. In addition, a considerable number of farmers acquired second-hand tractors from the neighbouring commercial farms. In the mid-1990s, the three northern communities rich in wildlife also bought community tractors for tillage purposes. These measures deepened the dependency of communities on mechanised tillage, and at the same time unknowingly exposed the farmers to international market forces and oil prices.

All the land prepared by tractors was invariably put under cotton, another factor that intensified cotton production. The tillage price was to a large extent affordable to the middle peasantry and the financial input credit schemes also covered tillage service charges. Throughout the tillage program history , LWF and subsequently LGDA bent backwards to accommodate the poor by offering tillage services on credit to an agreed number of poor farmers selected by the community members payable at the marketing stage.

Tractorisation had two profound effects in the region. Mechanical tillage contributed to the expansion of the area under cultivation as evidenced by the CIRAD (spell out) report covering three wards( 2,3 & 4) in its bio-diversity project. According to the report, the increase in cropping land from 1981- 93 was around 8% p.a. jumping to 25% between 1993-97 . While other factors such as migration especially after tsetse clearance, contributed to the increase, the primary cause remained mechanised tillage.

Secondly, cash proceeds from cotton sales increased, enabling many farmers to buy cattle. With the exception of three tsetse fly-infested areas, the rest of the eight wards are rearing cattle at present. Indirectly therefore, it contributed to the emergence of animal draught power to the detriment of tractors.

C.4 State Support Interventions

Meanwhile the state launched massive programs for the benefit of the locals, parallel to the above developments. These programs were largely implemented with financial development assistance from bilateral agreements with donors, notably the then European Economic Community (EEC) the European Union (EU) since 1995) and United States Aid for International Development (USAID).

• As already alluded to in the early 1980s the government introduced the Mid-Zambezi Development Plan. Its purpose was to reorganise villages by properly demarcating residential, arable and grazing land in order to facilitate the provision of services such as education, health, transport, water, electricity, etc to the communities. The African Development Bank financed the program through loans. The unintended effect was an influx of migrants from outside.

• A host of donors including the European Union, then referred to as European Economic Commission, funded the District Development Fund since 1981, an agency providing a host of services to the farmers. Besides tillage provision spurred by cotton production, it drilled boreholes, built and maintained feeder roads.

• In the health sector new health centres emerged as a result of central and local government efforts to provide services hitherto non-existent in the valley. The same developments took place in the education sector. Behind these developments was the powerful financial arm of the European Economic Community (EEC) later European Union.

• Towards the end of 1980s the state launched a tsetse-eradication program with the financial support of the EEC. The program managed to clear three quarters of Lower Guruve of tsetse flies, enabling an increasing number of farmers to acquire and rear livestock using proceeds from cotton sales. As well as providing social security, it meant that for the first time the villagers were accumulating substantial wealth on a wider scale. In fact some villages became self-sufficient in animal draught power.

• During the colonial period the indigenous people had been alienated from their natural resources, in this case wildlife. The government sought to restore ownership back to the indigenous people through the implementation of a programme called Communal Area Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) (time). Through this program, the communities receive 45% of the proceeds from commercial trophy hunting. These funds were used to finance community projects of their choice and pay household cash dividends. Grinding mills and tractors are some of the community assets bought by trophy hunting proceeds. Communities also received animal carcasses from trophy hunting for their meat supply. The programme was heavily funded by the USAID. The northern part of Lower Guruve is rich in wildlife and communities located there such as Kanyemba, Angwa and Masoka benefited substantially from this program.

D.0 Changes in Fortunes

The introduction of the World Bank/IMF Economic Structural Adjustment Programme in the early 1990s, the downturn of the economy in the late1990s and the subsequent political isolation of Zimbabwe during the course of the year 2002 dramatically changed the fortunes of the people. ESAP led to the liberalisation and privatisation of the economy in 1991. By introducing ESAP on the advice of the IMF and the World Bank the government hoped to accelerate economic growth, fund social services (health and education) and above all have the capacity to create jobs for the thousands of annual school leavers . The following effects were experienced after the adoption of ESAP. As will become apparent later these changes had the net effects of worsening the welfare of the people in /Zimbabwe

D.1 Deregulation Of Cotton Producer Prices

ESAP induced a government policy change on cotton producer prices, which was parallel to the US/EU guaranteed price policies. The change pushed the government from the centre of price setting to the periphery, marking the end of the era of guaranteed producer prices. Price setting was left to the invisible hand of market forces, i.e. the negotiations between the farmer organisations and the cotton merchants contracted to the big international cotton companies. just before the marketing season. The new system brought insecurity to the farmers, (without the government’s cushioning effect), as they no longer enjoyed guaranteed pre-planting prices. Under the new arrangement farmers produce and then anxiously wait for the announcement of producer prices during the harvesting season. The price set by the cotton merchants is directly related to the global price. Thus the farmers have been reduced to price-takers in a market of decreasing returns.

The negotiations between the representatives of farmer organisations and the cotton companies are heavily tilted in favour of the latter. While the companies base the producer price on the international value, the farmers take into account the costs of production especially under the present hyperinflationary conditions. The farmers attempt to recoup production costs, while cotton merchants stick to the international price (that has been on a downward trend for the past five years) dictated by US Agricultural Policy and other global forces . Thus disagreements inevitably arise between the two parties. The price offered by merchants usually prevails with minor adjustments due to unequal negotiating powers between the two parties. Inevitably farmers’ real income from cotton production is severely curtailed.

D.2 Emergence of Competition

Since the deregulation of the sector, new entrants came on board to buy seed cotton introducing an element of competition in the marketing of the crop. These players included Cargill, Farmers’ World, Cotpro and FSI Agricom. Cotton Marketing Board transformed in 1992 into a private entity called Cotton Company of Zimbabwe (CCZ). Competition in buying cotton ensued. Farmers adopted the practice of delivering quantities equivalent to the loan to CCZ, diverting the remainder to new merchants offering the highest prices. The traditional player CCZ, supporting production through the input credit scheme, complained bitterly on the practice threatening to withdraw its grower support that other merchants were not providing.

The managing director of CCZ had this to say on competition, “ Growers are enticed by short-term benefits such as higher producer prices from new entrants to side market their crop, thus prejudicing the viability of the scheme and limiting the ability of Cottco to roll over the funding into subsequent seasons. As a private company guided by stakeholder interests, Cottco cannot continue with the role of national benefactor, with competitors coming to reap where they did not sow”. (Financial Gazette 9/7/2003)

The withdrawal of support to offending farmers led to the collapse of Cotpro and Farmers’ World, companies without ginning facilities and the capacity to extend credit to growers. FSI Agricom closed due to unscrupulous business practices by its parent company although, previously, it had also offered credit to farmers. The remaining cotton merchants at present are CCZ and Cargill. Therefore the short-term benefits that the farmers had enjoyed during the period of competition were short-lived as state monopoly was replaced by private company monopoly, i.e. CCZ partly owned by the government . The cash boom for farmers was thus short-lived. They have to make do with what the remaining two companies are prepared to offer. CCZ controls 90% of the market and Cargill almost the remainder.

The 2004 marketing season was marred by price wrangles between farmer organisations and cotton merchants. The matter came to a boiling point with farmers demanding at least Z$3000/kg while the merchants offered Z$1800/kg only. The final price agreed on after the intervention of the Governor of the Reserve Bank was settled at Z$ 1900/kg, a far cry from the farmers’ expectation. It is clear that at the marketing stage there is unequal negotiating power between the two parties. It is the merchants that are in a position of strength. It is not a win-win situation for both parties, but for one.

The ultimate producer price paid is a function of the volatile global price, notwithstanding imperfections at the national level. According to Oxfam America, “Cotton has become a symbol of the inequalities of global agricultural trade owing to subsidies provided to US farmers that spur overproduction with harmful effects on developing country farmers. Subsidies have led to depressed world cotton prices resulting in reduced incomes for farmers and loss of export revenue for the developing country governments.”(Finding the Moral Fiber, Oxfam International, October 2004)

Over the last 10 years the United States (US) has sold cotton on the export market at prices well below the cost of production (See table 2). During the year 2003, cotton was exported at an average price of 47% below cost of production. This practice is termed dumping. The structural price depression associated with agricultural dumping has two profound effects on developing country farmers producing the same commodities. To start with, below cost imports drive the farmers out of their local markets. In the absence of safety nets of subsidies and credit, they may be forced to abandon their land resulting in the shrinking of the rural as well as the national economies. Secondly, developing country exporters find their global market share undermined by the policy of a depressed “global price “. Zimbabwe exports 70% of its total cotton output, with 30% destined for domestic consumption. Therefore, its exports are affected by the US dumping policy resulting in farmers getting less and less from their produce.

At the national level, from the low global price paid for cotton, cotton merchants get a lion’s share of it. Some analysts put the ultimate proportion received by primary producers at 30% of the ever-decreasing global price of cotton. From the above account, it is clear that livelihoods of cotton producers are under threat. Field observations and discussions with farmers during the 2004/2005 season reveal that growers have significantly reduced areas under the crop. One farmer remarked, “If you play around with a pencil, you realise that you are getting nothing from cotton”.

It is in this context surprising that CCZ tends to put the blame on dwindling farmers’ income on poor farming practices without mentioning the depressed international price due to EU and US subsidies. While Spain and US paid subsidies , of US$ 1.08 and US$ 0.34/lb during the crop year 2002/2003, Zimbabwean farmers are getting no subsidies from the government. The prize the Zimbabwean farmer gets is US$ 0.26/lb, which is US$.08. less than the subsidies given in the US and with no price guarantee that can reduce the risk of their production. The CCZ official saw inefficiency in farmers by declaring that, “Those farmers who are demanding an increase in the producer price of cotton are covering up for their failure to produce maximum quantities on their pieces of land. These farmers were reneging on the deal to sell their bales to us, despite the company having provided them with all the necessary inputs.”

D.3 Steep Price Escalations

Deregulation of the market brought in sharp unpalatable price increases across the board. Free market ideology stirred up wholesale sharp price rises. These increases not only inflated the cost of living for the populace in Zimbabwe, but also had immediate negative effects on the projects and programmes initiated during the 1980s by both the state and NGOs.

D.3.1 Cotton Production Costs

During the last four years farmers have struggled to secure seed and inputs due to sharp price escalations accompanied by shortages. The farmers have turned in large numbers to CCZ for inputs, becoming perpetual debtors to the company. In the process some of them abuse the facility obtaining inputs that are subsequently sold at giveaway prices to salaried personnel in order to raise cash especially during the trying times between December and February. This state of affairs is unhelpful to the farmers because at the marketing stage the company still deducts its dues, compelling them to repeat the same process. In this sense one could say that they are caught up in a debt trap.

D.3.2 Declining Use of Mechanised Tillage

The number of farmers receiving tractor tillage services declined on a yearly basis due to sustained steep tillage price rises. It became apparent during Lower Guruve Development Association (LGDA) monitoring workshops that the price had soared beyond the reach of the majority. There was also a general concern that the prices of the services were persistently escalating outstripping the increase in cotton producer price. The spare parts price escalations and high maintenance costs not only increased operational costs, but also meant that the depreciation allowance reserved for machinery replacement in future became terribly inadequate.

Many of these farmers opted for the cheaper animal draft power then available in tsetse free areas. Therefore the demand for tractor tillage services decreased to an economically unsustainable level. Over a decade the tillage price rose fivefold between 1985 and 1995 from Z$25.00 to Z$125.00 per acre

It became obvious that the tillage programme could no longer sustain itself economically without subsidies from the NOVIB grant during the mid- 1990s. Nonetheless it continued because of its political popularity with the farmers. A financial audit report by Matamba & Co. for the 1995-1998 period on the state of the LGDA tillage programme gives the following results.
Table 2: Audited Financial Statements for the Tillage Programme (1995-98)

The trend of performance in financial terms was one of increasing losses. Empirically, the programme was failing to self-sustain itself, as originally envisaged. When NOVIB decided not to subsidise the programme anymore, it came to an end in1998. The decision reduced areas under cultivation in communities infested with tsetse flies without an alternative source of draught power that resorted to the original hand tillage. While these figures refer to the LGDA fleet, they equally apply to all individually owned tractors and the DDF fleet. The tractors have since become dysfunctional due to high maintenance costs. The strategy of tractorisation thus exposed the community to the vagaries of the global market forces that were well beyond its control, therefore unsustainable. The same market forces killed the gains when the government support schemes to protect the vulnerable producers were abolished due to IMF demands. Over the years the tillage price has soared beyond the reach of the majority and the percentage of farmers using this method has declined from around 20% in the early 1990s to 4%, the present number of farmers dependent on tractors.

D.3.3 Deteriorating Milling Services

The fate of the milling projects remains precarious and in fact the majority have folded up.

What has led to the downfall of milling are not only the often mentioned internal management shortfalls, but primarily the unfavourable business environment in which they began to operate since 1991 onwards that sharply worsened since the year 2000. Prices were deregulated leaving the cooperative societies at the mercy of manufacturers. The management committees of these societies may not have well appreciated these changes but all the same the transformation had harmful effects on their operations.

Spare parts prices rose sharply to incredible levels and for long periods were scarce. The increased operational costs of the mills overburdened the weak management structures with the result that they gave in to the external economic forces compelling the majority into bankruptcy between 1996 and 2001.

Since the year 2000 when relations with the international community deteriorated, the shortage of foreign currency triggered the scarcity of fuel. This was the final nail on the coffin as the remaining mills then also became non-operational. Thus at the time of writing an increasing number of villages in the remote areas have resorted to the original laborious and time-consuming traditional milling or board buses to get milling services.

D.3.4 Dwindling Access to Safe Water

The purpose of domestic water provision is to provide the communities with safe drinking water in order to reduce the frequency of occurrence of diarrhoeal diseases.

The 1986 to 1995 migration of people into Lower Guruve strained the use of the established water points. A borehole ended up serving more people than the originally planned number, thus drying up or breakdown frequently. According to the Ministry of Heath and Child Welfare standards, a borehole should cater for a maximum of 250 persons, but under the present conditions boreholes are serving more 400 persons.

The maintenance system weakened after the withdrawal of donor grants from DDF. The agency used to maintain borehole pumps on behalf of the local authority. Since the suspension of funding after the 2002 presidential elections, DDF has not been able to discharge its duties as before. Efforts by development agencies to improve community-based maintenance system have proved to be inadequate. Local pump minders who charge exorbitant prices for repairs have to some extent undermined the maintenance system as well. A World Vision study covering 5 wards in Lower Guruve revealed that 51% of the households were reliant on unprotected sources of water. As borehole drilling has been halted due to suspension of funding and as more boreholes break down due to poor maintenance the proportion of households dependent on unprotected sources is likely to increase.

D.4 Suspension of Development Assistance Funds

The withdrawal of donor funding by the international community led by the EU and US in year 2002 has negatively affected two major programmes that had a wide impact on the livelihoods of the people of Lower Guruve. The programs are Tsetse Eradication and Campfire.

D.4.1 Tsetse Re-invasion

Since the launching of the tsetse eradication program in the late 80s, large areas had been cleared of the plague, enabling farmers to acquire cattle for the provision of draught power. The withdrawal of the EU funding has crippled the program, leading to the re-invasion of the area beyond the original geographic limits. The affected areas are Lower Guruve (Dande Communal lands), Communal Lands on the plateau adjacent to the escarpment (Bakasa and Kachuta) as well as Nyakapupu, a small-scale commercial farming area.

The cattle census for the affected area is given below. It shows the total number of cattle per village, the number of beasts inspected and the smears taken in the fight against trypanosomiasis..

Table 3: Cattle Census, Diagnosis in Tsetse Infested Areas, December, 2004
Communal land Village/Centre Census Inspected Smears Positive Trypanosomiasis

Source: Department of Veterinary Services, Guruve, 2004
(See maps 1 and 2 in the appendices for illustrations)

The figures show that a herd of nearly 63,000 beasts is endangered by the flies, demanding constant monitoring from the Veterinary Department. The spread of tsetse flies is due to inadequate tsetse targets, traps and the imported chemicals applied to traps to kill them, as well as the uncontrolled movement of animals both domestic and wild. Targets area used to detect the presence of tsetse flies while the traps kill them. The withdrawal of EU funding resulted in insufficient resources required for detecting and killing tsetse flies as well as insufficient transport services. The chemical used to attract and kill the fly is imported and at present in short supply. Added to this, is the period of social and political instability that disrupted the operations of the department resulting in uncontrolled movement of animals. Furthermore acts of vandalism by some villagers of stealing the buffalo fence that separated wild from domestic animals and the pilfering of targets to make curtains exacerbated the situation.

Therefore, livestock mortality rates due to trypanosomiasis have soared, becoming an issue of major concern to the farmers. The recorded mortality rate is higher in newly infested areas than the traditional tsetse areas because farmers in the former were caught in unawares thus unprepared for the scourge. In Dande, farmers have previous experience of tsetse bites and having received basic training in treating infected animals are able to diagnose and administer the relevant drugs in time. During the year 2004, there were 17 deaths due to tsetse flies out of the 120 reported cases. What this means at the moment is that the cost of rearing livestock in tsetse infested areas has increased due to the regular purchase of drugs to treat the infected animals by the farmers themselves.

In reality it means that the ecological factor is impoverishing a proportion of 72% of the farmers in Lower Guruve (those resident in tsetse fly cleared areas) through loss of cattle acquired during cotton boom periods. Furthermore, crop production is also under threat as a large number of farmers had resorted to animal draught power. In heavily affected areas donkeys are replacing cattle because they are more resistant to trypanosomiasis. Besides draught power cattle unlike donkeys provide milk and beef. At the moment the Department of the Veterinary Services is grappling with the scourge though with inadequate resources. It is premature to comment on the effectiveness of the efforts underway.

D.4.2 Animal protection – livelihood conflict re-emerging

While the CAMPFIRE program covers the whole Lower Guruve, it is three wards Kanyemba, Angwa and Masoka that benefit from trophy hunting. The major direct benefit from the program include 45% of proceeds from commercial trophy hunting , supply of meat by way of deliveries of trophy animal carcasses to the community and the control of problem animals, i.e. those that devour crops and are a danger to human life. Thus the mentioned wards rich in wildlife enjoyed cash and meat benefits from the program that others did not, and had become accustomed to them. The funds were invested in community projects and cash dividends paid to households. Owing to the migratory nature of the animals especially elephants wildlife committees were set up in the whole of Lower Guruve with the objective of minimising crop damage by elephants, through scaring by the Problem Animal Control Unit (PAC). Before the withdrawal of donor funding the program was effective bringing tangible benefits to the communities, as originally intended. The effects are most felt in controlling animal movements during the agricultural season and building the capacity of communities to plan and implement projects.

USAID funded almost 90% of the budget. Because of its participation, other supporting agencies such as World Wide Fund For Nature (WWF), Zimbabwe Trust (Zimtrust) and Centre for Applied Social Studies became involved in the program. The specific roles of USAID were;

• Bearing the costs of capacity building for the community, through training,
• Provision of vehicles, and footing the transport maintenance and running costs
• Providing grants for the employment of district council campfire manager and ward facilitator, and
• Initiation of non-consumptive wildlife activities (eco-tourism) to diversify community revenue base.

Owing to political differences after the 2002 presidential elections, USAID withdrew its support to Zimbabwe. Immediately afterwards, the other support agencies followed suit. The withdrawals had profound repercussions on the program. The data on the repercussions of termination of development assistance was obtained from Masoka, the richest in terms of wildlife. The political isolation of Zimbabwe by the international community weakened the program.

D.4.2.1 Emasculation Of Community Development Strength

Suspension of donor funding crippled the capacity building program with the result that the communities are unable to initiate and carry out programme activities as before. In the past, training services helped them to overcome implementation obstacles, which they cannot since the severance of relationship with service providers. Community initiated projects such as tillage and milling are floundering and the locals have no immediate answer to the predicament. The decision to terminate funding was unilateral, which did not take into account the capability of the communities to handle program affairs on their own.

Thus, the eco-tourism project has been suspended since the community does not have sufficient funds to complete it. It was left midstream. Chalets had been constructed and a hunting camp rehabilitated for the purpose. But, since the suspension of funding, the project was abandoned before the final touches of water, ablution and lighting systems had been installed. The whole project has become a white elephant.

Similarly the lifespan of the electric fence separating settlements from animals has expired. Wild animals especially elephants and buffaloes are beginning to invade human settlements, damaging property. The properties shattered include fruit trees, roofing and crops. The community cannot afford to replace the fencing from the previous accumulated funds. (A respondent said that his pile of roofing sheets was destroyed when an elephant stepped on them.)

D.4.2.2 Increasing Hostility between Wildlife and Human Beings

The expiry of the electric fence has enabled wild animals to stray into settlements thereby destroying property. Thus, instead of promoting harmony between animals and human beings, the original intention of the program, the situation is fuelling hostility between human beings and wildlife. Because of these occurrences the program is losing its original popularity amongst the inhabitants, as evidenced by the declining number of people attending wildlife meetings and an increase in illegal hunting. Enthusiasm in wildlife projects is rapidly fading. Furthermore, haphazard settlements are beginning to mushroom, something that had been corrected in the past.

D.4.2.3 Continued Crop Destruction by Wild Animals

The unit charged with the responsibility of controlling animal movements has been severely crippled by the suspension of donor funding. It can no longer respond to people’s reports of problem animals that devour crops as before due to insufficient transport services. Communication between the central unit and the village game scouts has been undermined. Therefore, it is failing to deal effectively with problem animals resulting in crop harvest losses.

Furthermore, the game guards have insufficient materials such as bullets for scaring the animals. Coupled with this is the curtailment of refresher courses due to budgetary constraints, that they used to attend at the beginning of each hunting season. At this point in time the village game guards are further demoralised by the low wages that they are getting, around Z$60,000.00 per month, a figure that the community can afford under the present circumstances.

The inhabitants declared that poor management of the animals is a disincentive for them to try a new sorghum variety, popular as a panacea to grain deficit in the valley. The variety is a favourite grass for the elephants. Failure to grow appropriate grain varieties is perpetuating food insecurity. Sanctions have brought Zimbabwe and Zambezi valley back to the old conservation – livelihood conflict.

D.4.2.4 Decline in Meat Supply

The villagers allege that there has been a decline in meat supply due to the declining number of animal carcasses delivered to the community. They claim that bad publicity of Zimbabwe results in cancellation of bookings, therefore less than the planned number of trophy animals is killed. District Council officer in charge of the program clarified the issue by saying that while Zimbabwe’s image has been tarnished by bad publicity, the quotas for trophy hunting have always been exhausted annually. In response to the challenge of bad publicity, the safari operators have adopted an aggressive marketing strategy that minimises contact between the client and the Zimbabwean public. A client is flown directly from the airport to the hunting camps and has minimal contact with the Zimbabwean public. There has been a decline in the number of carcasses delivered to the villages not because of a decrease in trophy hunting but because of the non-culling of breeding animals as a population control measure. A few years back, the program culled breeding animals on the instructions of the Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management donating the carcasses to villagers. Moreover, the increase in the human population results in the decrease in quantity of meat received per household. In Masoka the population has shot up from 126 in 1992 to 256 households 2002 (see table 1). Nevertheless there is an evident decrease in quantities of meat received by the households.

D.4.2.5 Scrapping of Household Dividends

The communities are no longer receiving household dividends. According to Council officials, it was a conscious decision taken by the communities to scrap dividends, and use the funds for payment of school levies, purchase of textbooks and bulk buying of grain for subsequent distribution to the villagers. The earnings from trophy hunting did not decline as a result of donor withdrawal, but remained steady as the following figures reveal, despite the bad publicity of the country, internationally.

Table 4: Earnings From Trophy Hunting for Masoka Village: Swanson’s Safari

Although there have been cancellation of bookings and postponement of hunts all the quotas set aside are depleted at the end of the season. These were mere disruptions that were overcome by the aggressive marketing strategy adopted by the operators. Thus suspension of funding directly impinged on capacity building and eco-tourism projects without significant negative effects on trophy hunting. What the communities are doing is filling in the gaps created by grant withdrawal using the proceeds from trophy hunting.

E. Conclusion

There are three major sources of livelihoods for the people of Lower Guruve, namely cotton production supported by animal draught power, off-farm employment in neighbouring mines, farms and towns, and earnings from trophy hunting. All the three are under threat from powerful external forces well beyond people’s control. All the three tend to be inter-dependent, reinforcing each other at household level.

Cotton production is under threat from low global prices induced by US agricultural policy change, benefiting large agribusiness keen to buy raw materials at prices well below the cost of production. In the case of Zimbabwe, the scenario is worsened by the hyperinflationary conditions that have seen input prices soaring and producer prices declining simultaneously. Thus the farmers have been progressively getting less real income from production. While the producers moan over the crisis there does not appear to be an immediate substitute for cotton as a cash crop. The opportunity cost of labour in the absence of alternatives is next to nil. Increasingly a large number of farmers are turning to macia, a sorghum variety introduced for food security purposes but which does not have the same potential to yield cash income as cotton. In this regard a large proportion of the households will be unable to meet their cash needs such as school fees, health bills, etc originally subsidised by the state.

Since the launching of SAP in1991, employment opportunities have shrunk to unacceptable levels. At the national level, it is estimated at 80%, and companies continue to close down due to competition from cheap imports and the declining commodity prices. At the moment it is not a viable option for the productive population in Lower Guruve.

At the political level, the isolation of the Zimbabwean Government by international community led by the EU and US the richest block of countries, prompted the withdrawal of funding for tsetse eradication and the productive conservation of wildlife. These events are threatening cattle regarded as a store of wealth by peasants. In addition, extra income from wildlife that had a cushioning effect on grain deficit particularly for the poorest communities is no longer realisable. These are factors well beyond the control of the communities themselves. It is hard to escape the conclusions that while sanctions were imposed to punish the Zimbabwean political leadership, they are hurting the ordinary poor peasant far much more than the intended target.