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On 3rd December, 1999,
the chairman of the Third Ministerial WTO Conference, Charlene
Barshefsky, the United States Trade Representative, announced
that the Conference had failed to reach consensus, and the
negotiations were transferred back to Geneva, the seat of
the WTO. Thus ended one of the most publicised, the most
talked about, the most controversial, and for the developing
countries potentially the most threatening conference of this
century. Was it a sign of the time that this should have
happened just as the world is turning around to a new millennium?
The following analysis is offered
on a tentative basis. Much happened at the Third Ministerial
meeting of the WTO at Seattle, USA, in November 30 - December
3, 1999, whose significance it is hard to assess so close
to events. It is difficult to say if it was just a “blip”
in the fortunes of the WTO or a major turn around. “Blip”
is an expression Western analysts use to deliberately underplay
the significance of events that have gone against them - for
example, the Asian financial crisis. From a third world perspective,
and from that of millions of people representing various movements
against globalisation and liberalisation, it is tempting to
say that the collapse of the Ministerial was not just a “blip”
but the first step to a revolution in our times. The truth
probably lies somewhere in between.
Indeed, much would depend on what
happens from now on. Would the Organisation of African Unity
that took the lead in challenging the process for lack of
transparency and participatory democracy, thus pre-empting
a forced “consensus” on the others, be able to sustain their
resistance? Would the Caribbean countries remain united with
the Africans? Would countries like India, Pakistan, Malaysia
and Egypt that played a key negotiating role in blocking consensus
on several substantive issues continue with their skilled
interventions in future negotiations? Would the peoples’
movements that thronged the streets of Seattle day after day,
and drew the world’s attention on the WTO process, keep up
the momentum on a global basis? Would, on the other hand,
the WTO power brokers consisting of mainly the US, Europe,
Canada and Japan, with a few supporters from the South, such
as, significantly South Africa, succeed in mending the WTO
fences that are now in tatters?
At this point let us analyse the
various forces that were colliding, clashing, aligning, dis-aligning
and “negotiating” at Seattle. There were essentially four
major forces.
First, and potentially the most
powerful, was the United States. It was potentially the most
powerful not only because the US is the most powerful trading
nation of the world, but it has also the power of sanctions
behind its threats when it chooses to use them. The US was
also in the chair of the Conference. Hence the threat made
by Mrs. Charlene Barshefsky on the eve of the collapse of
the conference, was no idle threat. She said that if there
was going to be no consensus, then the USA reserved the right
as chairman, to issue a statement on its own accord, as a
basis for future negotiations. (She is actually reported
to have said, “I need a declaration and you can bet your bottom
dollar that I will get it, even if it means changing the rules
of this house”.) The fact that the US was not able to do
so shows how badly it had bungled the process.
The second force included the
United States. These were the so-called “quad” countries
consisting of the US, the European Union, Canada and Japan
that have historically been the key players in GATT and the
two preceding Ministerial meetings of the OAU – in Singapore
in Geneva. At the third ministerial, they were joined by some
developing countries such as Brazil, Singapore, and South
Africa. (When President Clinton came to address the ministerial
delegates at a luncheon, the South African Industry Minister
was one of those privileged to be on his table). These were
the “mainstream” negotiators that met at what came to be known
as “green room” closed secretive discussions. Here is where
they negotiated agreements, and then announced to the outside
world as reflecting global “consensus”. These then were supposed
to create binding obligations even on those that were excluded
from the process. Those excluded consisted of the third force.
The third force consisted of the
developing countries from Asia, Africa, the Caribbean and
Latin America (except those co-opted into the mainstream).
They were the weakest force, at least until they reached Seattle.
In the months preceding Seattle, some of them (especially
a group of countries known as the “Like-Minded Group” with
India, Pakistan, Egypt, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Indonesia, Dominican
Republic as its key movers), had made bold attempts to bring
to the fore issues of concern to them. Largely, however, the
“quad countries” and their allies ignored them. Nonetheless,
their “alternative formulations” on key substantive issues
had found their way into the document that was issued by the
Chairman of the General Council on 18 November 1999. It was
this “cut and paste” document containing rival formulations
on practically every issue being negotiated that was the key
document at Seattle.
Finally, and not to be underestimated,
were the voices of the people, millions of people around the
world, who had been animated to take direct part in the WTO
process. They had been mobilising since the iniquities of
the Uruguay Agreements, and the negative consequences of the
process of globalisation, had begun to affect their lives,
their environment, their jobs and their moral sensitivities.
Those who were there at Seattle consisted of a tiny fraction
of these people, and may not even be truly representative
of them. At Seattle, the biggest group among them was the
20,000 strong Trade Union members who, encouraged by the Clinton
Administration, had organised protest against the WTO. They
were the labour force whose presence Clinton wanted to use
to badger the rest of the WTO members into including labour
as one of the issues in the WTO. Then there were those who
represented anybody or any cause that needed to be aired at
a conference of this magnitude – from those who wanted to
save turtles from being caught in nets designed for shrimps,
to the Tibetan sympathisers who were protesting against China.
Absent from the streets of Seattle were millions of others,
especially from the developing countries, for whom Seattle
was too far and too expensive to get to.
At Seattle the weakest became
the strongest. How did this happen?
First, the strongest got divided
and fractious. Having ignored the developing countries as
of no significance, they focused only on issues that concerned
them, the most important of these being agriculture. Agriculture
has been the bane of GATT ever since it was formed in 1948.
It was at first excluded from GATT, then grudgingly brought
into it under the Uruguay Agreements. Even then it was exempted
from most GATT rules, especially in Europe where agriculture
enjoyed a massive subsidy in the form of domestic support
and export subsidy. Against Europe were arraigned the so-called
Cairns Group of countries led by Australia (among them also
South Africa), and the United States, who demanded an end
to all subsidies. Europe resisted till the bitter end of
the Seattle conference. This was the major split between
the power block before and during Seattle. But Europe itself
was a divided house. In one dramatic episode, when the European
Commissioner agreed to a US-led proposal to establish a new
WTO working party on Biotechnology, fifteen European Environment
Ministers (as well as environmental NGOs) came out openly
to oppose such a move, creating much confusion in European
ranks.
Second, as the negotiations moved
into high gear, the developing countries (excepting the few
in the inner circle) found themselves excluded from these.
The power block had created 5 committees on five substantial
issues, where the developing countries could speak their minds.
But Barshefsky and the Director-General, Mike Moore, so skillfully
chose the chairpersons of these committees that in their summaries
they more or less ignored what the developing countries were
saying. At one point the
Zimbabwe delegation issued a statement saying: “Whilst we
applaud the setting up of issue-based Working Groups at this
conference, we are, however concerned that these Working Groups
have ended up as an exercise in pretence rather than transparency.
Real negotiations are taking place behind the scenes and the
majority of us have been reduced to by-standers. We are told
once again that we have to sacrifice transparency on the altar
of efficiency. This approach is unsatisfactory...” Already,
at the WTO-organised NGO symposium on 29 November, one NGO
speaker from the panel, also from Zimbabwe, had said that
the biggest problem the WTO was facing was lack of legitimacy
on account of the manner it which it took decisions.
By the second day of the conference,
the WTO had a veritable rebellion of the third world countries
at hand. Foremost among them was the OAU. It issued a statement
saying: “There is no transparency in the proceedings and African
countries are being marginalised... We are particularly concerned
over the stated intentions to produce a ministerial text at
any cost including at the cost of procedures designed to secure
participation and consensus. We reject the approach that
is being employed and we must point out that under the present
circumstances, we will not be able to join the consensus required
to meet the objectives of this Ministerial Conference.” This
was followed by a similar statement by the Caribbean Community
(CARICOM), and the Latin American countries also circulated
an unsigned statement protesting about the method the conference
was being conducted.
Now in panic, the US State Department
sent its most skilled negotiators to pacify the Africans.
They tried to co-opt the Industry Minister of Zimbabwe (by
now identified as the chief spokesperson of the African group)
into the process by offering to consider a draft declaration
that would satisfy the Africans. This was the first serious
effort made by the US to bring in the Africans. However, the
Zimbabwe Minister was not persuaded, and he refused to join
in the “green room” consultations. By Friday night, the closed-door
consultations amongst about 20 chosen countries in the “green”
room failed to reach consensus, and the chairperson, Barshefsky,
had to acknowledge defeat.
How does the process now move
forward? The negotiations return to Geneva, where the trade
ambassadors of the Member countries would continue to negotiate
on a draft declaration. It is unlikely that another fully-fledged
conference will take place sooner than six months. Having
lost the battle, the power holders are unlikely to rush into
another conference. They are likely, first, to prepare the
ground. We are likely to witness much arms-twisting and carrot-dangling
at developing countries. Those that are hard to co-opt, such
as Zimbabwe, are likely to face further isolation. Those that
are easy to co-opt will be sucked in with tangible rewards.
At Seattle, the OAU could stand together in a moment of shared
anger at being marginalised. They could unite on the issue
of process. However, when issues of substance come to the
fore, they are likely to get divided. The same is likely
to happen to the Caribbean and Latin American countries.
At the same time, the power holders,
mainly the US and the EU, will now seek to reconcile their
differences much more earnestly. They have seen that when
they quarrel, the proletarian nations of the world unite in
rebellion. At Geneva, then, the discussions will still continue
behind the scenes, but much more discreetly and secretly than
before. Only after they have agreed on major issues will they
open the discussion to the developing countries. In other
words, it is the opinion of this writer that the experience
of Seattle will not lead to immediate democratisation of the
WTO. The big players have much to lose by that.
Hence, the next strategy of all
progressive forces in the world would be to continue with
the work that they have been doing, only in a more intense
manner and at deeper levels. Five levels of action might
be suggested at this early stage.
The first is at the level of further
analytical and educational work on substantive issues that
will be negotiated in Geneva, such as agriculture, services,
investment, competition, procurement, environment, and labour
standards.
At the second level, there is
work to be done at building alliances that cut across nations
and peoples. In Geneva, the negotiations will involve trade
officials from various countries. The Like-Minded Group has
done sterling work in forging some kind of a common policy
front in the face of attempts by the big powers to exclude
the developing countries from participation in the WTO process.
That kind of alliance building and concrete action needs to
be strengthened.
The third is at the level of deepening
ideological and theoretical discussions. Seattle was a challenge
not simply to the WTO; it was a challenge to the whole process
of liberalisation and globalisation. The “experts” from the
North will continue to argue that growth in the developing
countries is a product of private capital, and so they must
create “enabling” conditions to attract foreign capital.
This would include good economic policies and good governance.
The progressive forces must continue to argue that democracy
and good governance are part of their agenda and not those
of the donors; that development is a product of labour and
natural resources as well as of capital; that good policies
must be based on equity and distributive justice and not simply
on attracting foreign capital into their countries; and that
unfettered capital-led globalisation is an unacceptable scenario
for the South.
At the forth level, the progressive
forces must mobilise grassroots support for their cause. In
the developing countries, their peoples are largely proletarian,
but the ruling circles are not. They belong to the global
elite and are likely to compromise national interests when
they are either bullied or bribed by the big powers. The
price of sustained democracy is eternal vigilance on the part
of the grassroots communities and their leadership. In the
developed countries, there is an upsurge of strong sentiment
in favour of justice for the developing countries, and for
such causes as the protection of the environment and justice
for oppressed women and children. They have all seen their
situation worsen under corporate rule and increasing globalisation.
There are forces such as the Trade Unions in the USA that
marched in favour of bringing labour standards within the
WTO discipline. More work needs to be done to engage them
in dialogue about the nature of the globalisation process.
Thus, more, and more intense, work needs to be done at the
level of global forces that are arraigned against the forces
of corporate globalisation.
Finally, at the fifth level, much
more work needs to be done at the institutional level, such
as in SADC in Southern Africa and in the OAU at the continental
level. As we saw, the unity of the OAU at Seattle was a product
of largely conjunctural factors. The OAU is likely to revert
to its usual fractious passivity. The SADC, on the other
hand, is already a divided house, with South Africa going
along with the global power brokers rather than with the rest
of its membership. Much work therefore needs to be done to
strengthen the institutional capacity of African organisations
to protect and serve the interests of Africa rather than those
of either global corporations or their local agents.
The challenges are many. However,
the Seattle experience has demonstrated that those challenges
can be faced. The impossible is possible.
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