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Yash
Tandon
The broader context of the negotiations
In order to understand the currently
ongoing ACP-EU negotiations, we have to put them under the
broader context of globalisation.
Globalization is presented to
peoples and governments in the third world not only as inevitable
but also as a positive force. It is inevitable in a sense,
yes, because it is part of the movement of history itself.
If nothing else, then the very rapid growth of telecommunications
and the information technology is itself a powerful force
for contracting space and time dimensions of globality. In
that technical sense, then, globalisation is indeed inevitable.
Whether globalisation in its political and economic forms
is also inevitable and whether it is also, at the same time,
a positive force for the third world is a much more controversial
proposition. We would contend that, on balance, it is not.
Globalisation and its quint-essential economic manifestation,
namely libralisation, is taking place in the present historical
conjuncture as an extension of the power of corporate capital
the world over, and it is this aspect of globalisation that
constitutes a negative force for much of the third world.
The effects of globalisation so far has been to increase the
gaps between and within nations. This is a fact repeatedly
documented even by the World Bank and United Nations institutions.
Of course, it is not necessary
that globalisation should take the form of capital led liberalisation,
but for an alternative form of globalisation to take place
requires a fundamental transformation of the production system
of the world and the global power dynamics that underly the
system.
But that is another world.
For now we need to entertain no
illusions about the fact that the ACP-EU future relations
are being negotiated in the context of capital led globalisation.
It is a context of intensified competition between nations
for world’s markets and resources driven primarily by the
profit motive of global corporations. In this framework
of negotiations, even big states such as the USA are driven
largely at the behest of their corporations in search for
markets and control over resources. It is important to emphasise
this point because the manner in which the ACP countries are
engaged in these negotiations gives one the feeling, in general,
that they think the EU countries owe them their bread. They
conduct themselves like supplicants rather than as hard-headed
negotiators. In other words, the ACP countries have not taken
seriously the changed environment of international discourse.
The EU negotiators, in this new environment, understand only
well-prepared briefs from ACP countries in which they can
haggle over every minute concession, much as market women
in Africa bargain over the prices of what they buy and sell.
May be it is better that ACP should send their market women
to bargain with the EU instead of their mild-mannered, soft-speaking
politicians and diplomats who arrive on the bargaining table
ill-prepared both in their briefs and in their temperament.
Collaboration and Competition between US, EU and Japan
A second aspect of these negotiations
that must be kept at the back of our minds is that Europe,
too, is faced with constraints of its own. They too have little
choice but to drive as hard a bargain out of ACP countries
as they can. It is, after all, a competitive world. Europe
is caught up in competition with the United States and Japan
for control of the same finite resources and markets of the
world. For example, the US Congress passed the “Africa Trade
and Opportunities” bill in 1998 partly to break European colonial
ties in Africa. Thirty-eight European conglomerates presently
control three quarters of African natural resources and developed
assets, and this has to change if the US is to gain a strategic
foothold in Africa. The EU-Africa negotiations under Lome
2000 must be seen against this background of inter-imperialist
rivlary for Africa’s resources and markets.
In this context, however, it is
important to remember that whilst the developed countries
compete against one another, they are united in defending
a system that works in favour of them collectively. They
have regular meetings, officially as G7 and in other bodies
such as at Davos in Switzerland, to concert on managing the
global system so that dissident elements that challenge or
disturb the system are kept in check
Here are a few examples of how
the developed countries act in concert vis a vis the third
world.
1) General Assembly Resolution
52/136: Development as part of Human Rights. The developing
countries asked for the end of politicisation of Human Rights.
The North voted against the Resolution. The EU proposed deletion
of 7 important paragraphs dealing with development aid.
2) The negotiations leading to
Uruguay Round and the formation of the World Trade Organisation
(WTO). The third world countries were largely excluded from
the process of the 8-year negotiations between the USA, Europe
and Japan, and then were asked to join the system more or
less on a take it or leave it basis.
3) At the Singapore Meeting of
the WTO in November 1996 matters of concern to the third world
were excluded from the agenda, and the OECD countries, led
by the USA, pushed issues of importance to them such as telecommunications,
labour standards, and the multilateral agreement on investments
(MAI).
4) At the Geneva meeting of WTO
in May 1998, the OECD, once again led by the USA, succeeded
in getting a declaration passed on electronic commerce without
consultation with the countries of the South.
5) The OECD countries are pushing
for the MAI which would involve the opening up of developing
countries to free flow of capital without them having the
power, or the right, to regulate it.
6) In the on-going negotiations
on services, the developing countries are being forced to
give up the "economic needs test” to control the entry
of banks, insurance companies, security companies and other
such services into their countries.
7) The developed countries hold
a more or less common position on anti-dumping which they
present as a safeguard measure, whereas in reality, in many
cases, it is a protectionist measure they take against the
so-called “cheap” imports from the third world.
What Does Europe want to get out of Lome 2000
It wants two things. First as
part of the global imperial system, it wants the ACP countries
to fall in line with the whole process of globalisation.
Second, it wants to pursue its own agenda in relation to the
ACP countries, and increase its own advantages in these countries
in rivalry with US and Japan.
As part of the global imperial
system, Europe has the following mandate in its negotiations
with ACP countries.
One, it wants the ACP to be part
of the WTO-compatible regime of trade. In particular, it
wants, among other things:
a)
The removal of preferences for ACP countries in favour
of full reciprocity. This is the famous "levelling the
playing field" concept which the third world regard as
unfair because it puts on equal footing unequal partners.
Lome was based on recognising this inequality. By the end
of the year 2000, the GSP system under Lome will end.
b)
The application of the WTO sanctions machinery which
is extremely onerous for developing countries because of asymmetrical
power relations between them.
c)
The application of Trade-Related Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS) and Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs)
which have the combined effect of denying a transfer of technology
to the third world, and the monopolisation of technology control
by the multinationals, as well as other consequences detrimental
to the development of their economies.
Two, it wants to strengthen
the watchdog role of the IMF over ACP economies. Over the
last thirty months, since specifically the financial crisis
in Mexico in early 1996, third world economies are reeling
under attacks on their currencies by speculative capital.
The meltdown of East Asian economies, until recently held
as models of development, is part of this scenario. The Asian
crisis is now creating depressant effects on the economies
of the developed countries too as part of the globalising
forces. The G7 countries are engaged in restructuring the
system in order to regulate it so that these crises do not
repeat, and part of this arrangement would involve a stricter
monitoring of the financial and banking policies and institutions
in the South. Europe will play the role of negotiating such
a regime in relation to the ACP countries.
Three, Europe wants to push for
acceptance by the ACP countries of MAI whose principal aspects
are: the free flow and protection of private capital; “national
treatment” for foreign capital so that they have equal, or
better, facilities in third world economies; generous terms
for the repatriation of profits; and privatisation of state
owned assets in the third world. Practically speaking, MAI
lays down the basis for handing over third world economies
to corporate capital control of western monopolies.
Four, it wants to secure standardization
of political values and their enforcement on ACP countries.
Such concerns as human rights, labour standards, environment
standards, good governance, rule of law, efficient public
service, etc. – all “good” values in themselves – are becoming
the means to further control the third world. They are now
routine conditionalities in the development policies of OECD
countries. As the EU’s “Blueprint for ACP-EU Relationship
to the 21st Century”, February 1998, says: "Political
dialogue will be the watchword in new partnership" (p.9)
The third world has tried to resist the politicisation of
these values, and above all, them being used as trade barriers
and as excuses for sanctions against them. But because of
the financial and military muscle of the industrialised countries,
the third world is fighting a losing battle here.
Five, Europe wants to strengthen
action against drug trafficking, corruption, terrorism and
illegal immigration. These are some of the backlash manifestations
of increasing immiserisation of the peoples of the third world
in their desparate struggle for survival. The developed countries
are building corridors of safety for themselves not by opening
up the doors to immigration or by improving the economies
of the third world but by military and semi-military means
of keeping out and punishing the poor and the desparate of
the third world.
These are the five essential
services that Europe will perform on behalf of the global
imperial system in its negotiations with the ACP countries.
However, as indicated earlier,
Europe is also in competition with US and Japan for global
markets and resources, and so it has its own agenda as distinct
from it acting as part of the imperial system. Europe needs
to strengthen its hold over former ACP countries in rivalry
with US and Japan. The latest document of the EU lays put
the following general strategy to achieve this objective.
The eventual basis of the relationship
between EU and the ACP countries is to be within the framework
of separate Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with each of the
three regions -- Africa, Caribbean and the Pacific. An FTA,
one may recall, is an agreement where internal tariffs within
the Agreement countries are removed, but each country can
levy its own tariff on third countries. (A Common Market,
by contrast, is an arrangement where internal tariffs are
removed between the countries and then they have a common
external tariff). One effect of this would be that whilst
Europe will enjoy lower tariffs in all the former ACP countries,
the latter could impose differential tariffs vis a vis one
another.
The second pillar of the EU strategy
is to negotiate a FTA with South Africa under the new globalised
WTO framework, and then use this as a model to negotiate with
other countries/regions. It may be recalled that the EU refused
South Africa's request to become a full member of Lome on
the grounds, among others, that South Africa is a "developed"
country according to WTO classification. If SA were to negotiate
within the Lome framework, it would have been entitled to
preferential, i.e. non-reciprocity, treatment. The denial
of Lome-type preferential treatment is the new basis under
which Europe wants to relate to the rest of the ACP countries.
The EU and SA are already negotiating an FTA with a view to
creating a duty free area covering "substantially all
trade" within say next 10 - 12 years. Another significant
aspect of these negotiations is the language in which the
agreement is to be defined. Unlike the Lome agreement characterised
by a patronising tone, the FTA with SA would be strictly business-like
in tone, strictly contractual. This is also an interesting
departure from past practice and reflects the new post-Uruguay
trade environment.
The third pillar of the new relationship
consist of the transitional measures that are to be put in
place before full FTAs are in operation. These include:
-
introduction, by stages, of reciprocity in trade relations;
-
waiver under Article IX of WTO Agreement to first five
years after year 2000;
-
beyond market access, improve conditions of development
of trade and private investment
-
compensation for fluctuations in earnings for basic
products;
-
return of illegal immigrants to countries of origin
-
decentralised cooperation with NGOs, churches, local
authorities, etc. without going through state
monitoring;
-
EU funds to shift from individual projects to macro-economic
sectoral policy reforms.
The time table envisaged by EU
for the various stages is the following:
1998 - 2000 Negotiations of Framework
Agreements
2000 - 20005 Negotiations of
Regional Economic Partnership Agreements
2005 + Implementation of Regional
Agreements
Forward strategy for Africa
This must be addressed at two
levels:
A) What do African Governments
want?
B) What should African Civil
Societies demand?
What African Governments want
At Libreville in Gabon, the African
members of the ACP laid out their main objectives.
These, principally, are:
1)
African countries want Lome 2000 to help them to integrate
their economies into the global economy. "We consider
competitiveness as path to Africa's salvation; hence we should
aim to integrate our economies into global economy" (p.11)
2)
They endorse the reigning orthodoxy that the private
sector is the engine of growth.
3)
They will seek transitional waivers on application
of WTO rules to trade preferences.
The position Civil Society should take
1.
First, it is important that they make a careful study
of the contemporary period. What are the forces behind the
process of globalisation, how does the EU-ACP negotiations
fit into this process, and what is lost and gained in the
process of integration into the global agenda? In other words,
African civil societies should not take for granted, as their
governments appear to be doing, that integration into the
global agenda of the West is both inevitable and unproblematic.
2.
Secondly, they should study the EU strategy carefully
and critically.
3.
Thirdly, they should make a critique of African official
line along at least the following lines:
·
Africa does not have to accept integration into
global economy under terms set by the EU - WTO
·
Africa must reject the orthodoxy that growth
comes from foreign capital or from the private sector. It
should learn that growth comes primarily from Africa’s natural
resources, and the labour and skills of African people.
·
In any case, growth is not the ultimate goal.
The ultimate goal is social welfare. African civil society
should present an alternative development scenario that is
based, first and foremost, on satisfying the basic needs of
the people, and not, as now, on satisfying the World Bank
and donor-based strategies of export promotion.
4. Fourthly, However, while making
a critique of official line, civil society should support
their governments:
·
to get firm commitments from EU on maintaining
existing trade preferences
·
to extend the time horizons for transitional
measures beyond 2005
·
to extend the period of phased introduction
of "elements of reciprocity"
5.
Finally, African civil society should go beyond the
official line:
·
to oppose MAI - delink it from Lome 2000 negotiations
·
to oppose the linking of the issues of human
rights and labour standards with trade
·
to negotiate for better terms of trade between
Africa’s exports and its imports
·
to commission African academics to carry out
a study of the impact of loss of preferences (scheduled to
disppear in 10-20 years) on African economies
·
to take a very critical look at the Regionalist
perspective of FTAs presented by the EU
·
to take into account different levels of development
of each country within each region
·
to reject EU's formula of treating LDCs within
the region as part of the FTA. For example, treating LDCs
such as Swaziland and Lesotho as “developed” countries within
the definition of an FTA between SA and the EU would be highly
unfair to the two LDCs, and would constitute a (further) divisive
issue within the South African Customs Union.
·
to insist that the timing of integration within
each region should be determined by indigenous processes in
each region and not dictated by EU's time-table
·
to address the issue of subsidies and tariffs
within the region before moving towards free trade agreements
with the EU (a premature agreement with the EU will lead to
a situation that southern Africa is already facing today,
for example in the dumping of European subsidized beef on
the South African market at the cost of producers in Botswana).
·
to carefully monitor South Africa’s negotiations
with EU which are presently shrouded by a veil of secrecy.
Conclusion
Africa should not present itself
as supplicants to EU as its Governments appear to be doing.
Yes, we need European markets, but so does Europe need our
markets and resources. Let us not sell our resources cheaply.
And let us take the attitude that China does towards WTO.
They want to join WTO, but not under any terms. We want to
trade with Europe but not under any terms.
References:
EU Documents:
1.
Green paper, November, 1996
2.
Guidelines, October, 1997
3.
EC's Recommendations to Council to Negotiate Partnership
Agreement with ACP. Blueprint for ACP-EU Relationship to the
21st Century, February 1998
ACP-Africa Documents:
1.
Africa's Contribution to ACP Summit on ACP-EU Future
Relations, Libreville, Gabon, November 7, 1997
2.
Road Map for Effecting Participation of African Countries
in Approaching WTO Negotiations, OAU. EDECO/TD/11/1998, May
98
3.
Declaration of ACP NGOs on ACP-EU Relations in 21st
Century, Uganda, October 1997 |
