A closure analysis of this model shows that the civil society arm is largely an extension of external foreign policy since resources given to support local and regional civil society organizations (CSOs) activities are suggested, formulated and approved by developed countries’ governments and parliaments. In many cases, largely due to the influence of capital, CSOs prefer taking instructions from their paymasters – which are donors and donor agencies and fellow CSO’s partners in the north than from the national governments. This behaviour is high during the period characterized by poor relations between the government and the other sectors of the state. This was the case with Zambia (under President Kaunda) and Malawi (under President Banda) and now with Zimbabwe.

Similarly, the private sector in the region consists largely of subsidiaries of global capitalism whose headquarters are in Europe and America. Like the foreign funded CSOs, locally or regionally based private sector has failed over the post-independent era to overcome the influence of their headquarters despite the fact that local and regional scholarship has assumed influential positions in these companies. Thus, the firms continue to be directed daily on issues relating to where, when and how much to invest by their headquarters. This, in situations of sour relations as alluded above, contributes to political risks to the individual regional country or the entire region. Studies have shown that in those countries characterized by conflicts – either direct or indirect, the private sector capital migrate to their headquarters including the regional powerhouse – South Africa, which currently dominate not only the regional economies but also the continent. The victim of this capital flight includes Angola, Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe. In some countries, this development resulted not only in raising the political temperature between the government and the governed due to growing unemployment, deepening poverty and social disorientation, but also culminated in regime change – the case of Malawi and Zambia. In other countries, the capital flight has resulted in more conciliatory positions among political parties, which culminate in political settlement among the rivalry political parties such as the case of Mozambique and Angola. In Zimbabwe the political settlement between the main political parties is yet to be found. Meanwhile, the level of capital flight is further worsened by malpractices within the indigenous entrepreneurs in which some leading personalities have been found externalizing huge volumes of local and foreign currency at a time the economy was/is facing huge challenges. Also rising unemployment and bleak future particularly concerning the youth is very worrisome to long-term political stability. The cross border activities of Zimbabwean nationals, particularly in South Africa and Botswana coupled with xenophobic practices in the host countries is fueling inter-states tensions thereby posing a political threat to regional peace, integration and cooperation.

The third pillar is the donor industry, which is not only becoming politically influential, but also act as foreign policy outreach of Western governments. The donor community is known to pursue the interest of the developed countries, especially in cases where this relates to the protection of foreign capitalism and its expansion. Most of donor resources are concentrating of such issues like human rights, governance, constitutional reforms, cultural reforms, etc. all of which are critical in raising the shortcomings of the existing political system in some regional countries. This is also related to political conditionalities in the form of human rights, governance and democratic issues, political pluralism, corruption and issues of accountability as well as the desire for regime change as argued above. Political conditionalities justifies donors threats to either cut or completely withdraw financial support until its interests is saved.

In addition, the nature of aid – recipient relationship in the respective regional countries emerged as another threat to political stability in the region. This has been the case in Zambia, Malawi, Zimbabwe and Botswana. In these countries and many others in the region, donors have threatened and eventually withdrew aid resources largely due to either poor relations (Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe) or the desire to test the resilient of the renown democratically model in Africa (Botswana). This affects projects or programmes implementation, especially in cases where the implementation agents has been the government. Recently also, donors have been known to prefer working with civil society organisations instead of governments. This has further contributed to the tension that exists between the government and civic bodies. Therefore, donors’ withdrawal of resources has direct impact to government projects, a development that further alienates government from the people. This development has also been attributable to the “one jacket fit all” neo-liberal policies that have been forced to most countries in the region by the Bretton Woods Institutions of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. In all the regional countries, which have adopted these policies, the pattern of political and social tensions has been systematic. Thus, in the region, those countries with political tensions have experienced a situation where the relations increasingly deteriorate between the government on the one hand and the other three sectors on the other. It thus emerges that this is a continuous source of political risks.

It is also argued in this paper that corruption is emerging as threatening political stability on many countries of the region. What is more worrying is the contribution of donors to the problem. It is emerging that in some countries such as Zambia and Malawi after the regime change, there was a sudden influx of donors competing to be associated with the new political order. This was despite glaring shortage of capacity to absorb these resources. Thus, donors also contribute to political instability in the region.

The relocation of donors’ offices further worsened the perception about the prevailing socio-economic and political threats to the individual country in particular and the region in general. This development is further vindicated by the strong political stance taken by the three sectors.

The on-going Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) are also a source of potential threat to political stability and regional integration. This is more so in the SADC region, where countries belong to different EPAs. For instance, while South Africa has already concluded its trading arrangement with the EU, the five countries (DRC, Malawi, Mauritius, Zambia and Zimbabwe) and seven countries (Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland and Tanzania) are negotiating under different configuration. This development has potential political risk in that the region has once again fall pray to the dictates of the global forces. This has the potential also to disintegrate the countries, despite earlier calls to respect deep integration. In addition, the fast-tracking of negotiations, which are likely to benefit the powerful EU economies, is likely to result in shrinking the production and export capacities of the much-fragmented region.

Related to this is the influence of South Africa, whose political hegemony and capital imperialist tendencies are not benefit other regional countries. The spillover effect is not accruing to other regional member-states. Studies have shown that the expansion of South African in the region and the rest of African countries have an element of exploitative practices historically associated with global capitalism. This has been the case of the Shoprite, which not only recruit local employees as casual labour for a period of six months before replacing them, but also fail to support local production structures including potatoes producing farmers. In many cases, the South African based capital enterprises even import such commodities like chips into the host country despite the availability of the same commodity. This means that economic activities in the rest of regional economies continue to experience limited expansion while that of South Africa is booming. Thus, the threat of political instability arises from the limited scope of employment potential due to supply-side constraint. These threats are also posed by global trading regimes of the WTO and EPAs.

Related to the above is the threat that comes from the spirit of political solidarity, which unfortunately result in limited capital formations as the case between Zimbabwe and South Africa. It thus emerges that while politically the two countries have championed the spirit of solidarity, this has not be reciprocated by the nature and conduct of economic activities. Indeed, the flight of capital to South Africa from Zimbabwe, which has also attracted high competent personnel, has or is contributing to the political tension in the latter. This development is worsened also by internal concerns that fail to protect national interests as well as lack of political will to pursue policies that are above political rhetoric.

The above analysis shows that in developing countries including those in the region, the three sectors – namely – the civic bodies, private sector and the donor community - seem to have common agendas that in most cases differ from that of the governments. It thus appears that the government is isolated, hence its reaction to issues of national interests. All the above shows that the region in general and Zimbabwe in particular has many potential political challenges to overcome if economic activities are to expand to satisfactory levels. This challenges call for committed leadership and scholarship in the region whose spirit is first and foremost to promote development and economic growth in the region. Leadership in this case encompasses heads of the civil society institutions and captains of industries, the very group that prefers instructions from their Western headquarters and financiers than working closely with their governments. Given the above, it is therefore imperative to have strong political institutions with strong regional links and beyond. This is necessary to assess political risks with the view to take precautionary measures before the situation worsened. The regional member-states should also define in more practical terms the rules of the game, especially as this relates to the interface between the region and the global world. It also necessary to develop deliberately the indigenous cadre whose conduct of business is far beyond party politics.