Introduction
While in the context of Lome Convention, trade cooperation
was a function of preferential tariffs, under the African-Caribbean-Pacific
(ACP) – European Union (EU) Agreement (popularly
known as Cotonou), the economic and trade cooperation
consist of a more complete set of arrangements that include
cooperation in other areas linked with trade. This broadened
the scope of engagement, hence the inclusion of non-state
actors in the process. The Cotonou Agreement signed on
the 23rd June 2000 provides a framework for involving
non-state actors to actively participate in the formulation
of co-operation policies and strategies, and their subsequent
implementation. The inclusion of non-state actors in the
ACP-EU partnership is a new feature whose main objective
is to involve these parties in the definition of strategies
and priorities, which hitherto were the exclusive jurisdiction
of governments. The aim is to establish mechanism, which
reconciles state responsibilities, and the recognition
of the increasing role-played by non-state actors in the
development process. This means that for the first time
in the history of ACP-EU trade relations, the non-state
actors got recognition to directly input in the bilateral
trade negotiations.
However, deep involvement coupled with wide consultations
of civil society remains a complex issue largely because
of disparity of the situation of civil society in the
different ACP countries as determined by the democratic
space obtained in the member-states. Fundraising difficulties
and tight conditions linked to EU money is another limiting
factor that is prevalent in the 6 ACP EPA regions. Having
observed the above limitations, the ACP Secretariat promised
to organize private sector and civil society fora designed
to elicit useful reflections from them (participants),
which feed into the bilateral trade negotiations . However,
the ACP Secretariat promise remains a pipe dream up to
now. Not to be outdone, the ACP leadership during the
launch of EPA configurations expressed strong desire to
involve non-state actors in bilateral trade negotiations,
a promise that was well demonstrated by all 6 EPA configuration
road maps whose central thesis was “wide consultations
and involvement in the new trade pact”.
State of play at the ESA Configuration
In the spirit of the Cotonou Agreement, the Eastern
and Southern African (ESA) configuration has since its
launch in February 2004 (Mauritius) pronounced its eagerness
to involve national and regional civic bodies in the
on-going process. ESA-EPA road map has established national
and regional structures whose mandate is to develop
positions to trade off with the EU positions. As such,
each country has to establish the National Development
Trade Policy Forum (NDTPF) comprising government and
non-state actors. This structure is supposed to facilitate
wider consultations among all stakeholders as well as
guide the process of developing national positions before
tabling them at the Regional Negotiating Forum (RNF).
At each RNF meeting, every country is mandated to submit
progress report that reflects activities being implemented
and the level of consultations. However, this assumption
forgets that some countries still lack the democratic
space that allows civic bodies to participate in this
process while others have not only weak, but underdeveloped
non-state actors. Even in those countries where say
private sector and other socio-economic actors are relatively
developed, the level of ignorance at the membership
level about this bilateral trade engagement is shocking.
At the regional level, ESA-EPA negotiations provide
space for one regional civic body to be involved. The
Southern and Eastern African Trade Information and Negotiation
Institute (SEATINI) currently occupies this space largely
due to its track record in multilateral and bilateral
trade negotiations. Indeed, SEATINI has been contributing
to the process and is the only civic body participating
in the Regional Negotiations Forum (RNF) meetings. In
addition, the organization has developed mechanism for
informing its strategic partners about the balance of
forces and content of discussions at the RNF. But SEATINI’s
lone voice so far justifies the call for investing in
building capacity and networking among national and
regional non-state actors as well as mounting negotiations
training skills that target government chief negotiators.
This also calls for running workshops and seminars for
members of parliament (MPs), especially those dealing
with trade protocols at the national and sub-regional
level. All the outlined programme activities seek not
only to address the prevailing limited democratic space
in some member-states, but also create conditions for
cross fertilization of knowledge and ideas on trade
bilateralism.
Despite all the above pitfalls and weaknesses, are
there lessons to learn with the view to support the
Cotonou Agreement framework of “wide consultations
and involvement of non-state actors”?
What are SEATINI’s observations?
From all the ESA-EPA meetings held so far, the discussions
still lack the requisite socio-economic and political
analysis of the sub-regional challenges and dynamics
this process is facing within the ESA configuration.
This is worsened by little scrutiny from member-states
coupled with their seemingly passive attitude that result
in surrendering the whole process to the coordinating
regional secretariat – the Common Market for East
and Southern Africa (COMESA). In addition, the dangling
of developmental aid by EU has triggered fast emotions
by each configuration to rush the process so as to be
the first in concluding an EPA. Meanwhile, the unclear
circumstances so far are conducive enough for the EU
to push the “new issues” it was forced to
drop during the World Trade Organization (WTO) talks
back on the agenda via EPAs. This is clearly seen by
the fact that while the ESA configuration has so far
dwelt on procedural matters, their counterparts in the
EU, have already developed firm positions for talks.
All country delegates have failed to submit written
progress reports as mandated by the ESA-EPA road map.
Instead, only verbal country briefings have become the
order of the day. This not only undermines the NDTPF
mandate, but also becomes a fertile ground for giving
false impressions of what is happening at the respective
country level. As a result, some countries end up misleading
the RNF by reporting activities and programmes that
are not shared at the NDTPF including the status of
National Assessment studies and wide consultations and
involvement of non-state actors.
In many countries, the necessary broad consultations
as required by the ESA-EPA road map are not yet there.
Even in those member-states with viable private sector,
the knowledge of the on-going process is restricted
to the secretariat. The membership is still in dark.
The media is not helping either. Despite this serious
weakness, verbal reports by many country delegates are
silent on “wide consultation and involvement”
of non-state actors. Obviously, respective country delegates
cannot embarrass themselves in front of their peers,
a development that endorses a process of minimal involvement
of non-state actors in the on-going bilateral trade
negotiations. This is contrary to the spirit of the
Cotonou Agreement framework.
Indeed, in many countries including those which hosted
the RNF meetings, the level of publicity of this process
leaves a lot to be desired. For instance, the Entebbe
(Uganda) RNF meting was not well covered in the media
(both print and electronic). In many ESA countries,
there are insignificant debates in the media coupled
with total absence of public platforms aimed at pointing
out the pitfall of this process. Thus, the level of
awareness raising in many ESA countries remains very
low, a development that is worsened by weak civil society
coupled with governments’ desire to fast-track
the process. There is scant scrutiny of the process
from the ESA-member-states who are eager to access developmental
aid from the EU. At least for now, the whole process
in many countries lacks the requisite mobilization strategy
while at the same time weak networking among stakeholders
at both the national and regional (configuration) level
is failing to halt the fast-moving EPA train.
The above therefore indicates clearly that the process
lacks the critical voice of non-state actors, particularly
that of civil society movement. The process till lacks
the ability to co-ordinate and organize workshops and
seminars whose throughput contributes positively to
RNF deliberations. So far, very few countries have an
organized civil society that is participating at the
NDTPF. However, there is much knowledge of the process
from regional civic bodies, which have expressed readiness
to assist in building capacity of other non-state actors.
As argued before, some countries still lack democratic
space to engage freely in this process. But there are
also other regions such as the East African Community
(EAC) comprising of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, where
efforts to harness civil society and Economic Committee
MPs from the EAC Parliamentary Assembly are bearing
fruit.
The above shows that countries are far apart in terms
of engaging the process. While few are focusing on issues,
the majority are either focusing on broad political
relations and/or imperatives with the EU, or are still
appreciating this process. Some member-states lack capacity
to prepare for these negotiations as public officials
keeps on alternating from meeting to meeting. Indeed,
many countries suffer from lack of institutional memory
as constant rotation of staff to these important meetings
defeats this purpose.
There is high propensity by countries to look to the
EU for support on every aspect of this process. This
is despite the cry against delays in disbursement of
funds (for research and publicity) and widespread unhappiness
about the quality and focus of National Assessment studies
done by consultants selected by EU, usually from the
North and other sub-regions. Common complaints include
failure by the consultants to include national elements
in the studies, short time given to consultants (mostly
done within a month), failure to involve national academics
in the studies and weak and/or limited consultation
of all stakeholders .
There are 12 countries, which are LDCs out of the total
16 ESA member states. There is suspicion by some countries
within the ESA configuration, especially small economies
that feel that they are being taken for a ride to support
4 non-LDCs member-states. Already, the 12 LDCs have
access to the EU market through the “everything,
but arms” initiative. This means that these countries
have little to gain, but plenty to loose if the EPAs
outcome involve reciprocity. At least for now, these
12 countries believe that the EU need not and should
not impose reciprocity to the existing trade arrangement.
Conclusion
While the Cotonou Agreement framework is clear on broadening
non-state actors participation, the above analysis shows
some serious weaknesses. Beside the dominance of the
EU through various funding procedures and the passive
attitude of governments, the regional coordinating secretariat
has until now remained blind to the need to invest more
in building capacity among the civic bodies, a process
that assists in widening consultations. At the same
time, developing positions suffer from low broad participation
at both the national and regional levels. There are
very few countries that have solid national structures
capable of developing both offensive and defensive positions.
To date, a significant number of member-states are still
putting the tools of analysis in place, a development
that is further worsened by failure to complete the
studies in time. Expectations are therefore high for
the forthcoming Madagascar RNF meeting to begin to see
countries submitting their positions on key issues,
a process that feeds into the regional front. Already,
individual countries in the EU have already finalized
their long list of positions, and are likely to accelerate
the process. At the same time, the regional secretariat
is yet to intensify training activities as well as supporting
workshops and seminars designed to equip country negotiators
with knowledge the assist in this process.
There is no adequate checks and balance since there
is no wide consultation in the process. This is the
area where urgent solutions are needed in terms of coordinating
strategies that minimize the negative outcome from this
process. Any poor deal (bad EPA outcome) as a result
of a flawed process only increases the profit margins
of EU exporters rather than lowering prices to consumers
and ESA importers. Failure to clearly articulate offensive
and defensive interests results in sharp falls in customs
duty revenues leading to low socio-economic development
and political instability.
Coordination of strategies at the ESA region is very
crucial, especially between authorities and ambassadors
as well among all the stakeholders including governments
and the regional secretariat.
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