The third Regional Negotiating Forum
(RNF) meeting to define the future of Eastern and Southern
Africa (ESA)-the European Union (EU) trade regime was
held in Antananarivo, Madagascar from 18th to 20th October
this year. This meeting followed hard on the heels of
the Dedicated Session on Fisheries, in which the ESA coastal
or island member-states had agreed on a compromise on
Marine Fisheries Rules of Origin. But more of this later.
The progress of the National Development Policy Trade
Forums (NDPTFs) remains almost the same as reported in
the Entebbe meeting. The Secretariat reported that it
had not received any written reports on the activities
of NDTPFs and that only five countries had submitted copies
of their impact assessment studies . SEATINI’s presentation
further exposed inherent weak consultations and involvement
of all key stakeholders in the process. For example, the
failure to respect the ESA-EPA roadmap guidelines such
as submission of written progress reports to the meeting.
It was further argued by SEATINI that anything short of
written reports makes it very difficult for interested
parties to assess the level of consultations and involvement
in each ESA member-state. Unfortunately, some members
feel it is not important to reveal the weaknesses being
observed. This is really a major worry to those keen to
see a fair and just EPA outcome in this configuration.
We feel it is high time governments officials understand
that as long as the laid down criteria is not followed,
particularly on effective engagements, then the process
will go nowhere. In the subsequent discussions, SEATINI
not only reminded the meeting about the danger of not
consulting and involving widely, but also queried why
ESA institutions (governments and regional secretariat)
seem to be afraid of close scrutiny by stakeholders, particularly
civil society. Interestingly in an effort to exonerate
themselves from SEATINI’s pointing finger, some
delegates went on to inform the meeting that so and so
was from the non-state actor as well as quoting the invitation
letter as in line with the spirit of ensuring that countries
delegation include non-state actors. Close observations
noted that some delegations only included the private
sector without the civil society organisations, non-governmental
organisations and some social movements, which was the
central thesis of SEATINI’s presentation. However,
SEATINI is mindful of the fact that such countries like
Kenya, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe had included members
of the civil society in their delegations. In fact, Kenya
had a member of parliament in their delegation. It is
imperative in future for delegations to inform the RNF
meeting of their composition, especially given lack of
written progress reports that inform national activities,
processes and developments.
The above clearly show weak preparedness on the ESA
member-states to begin to meaningfully talk of the configuration’s
positions. As argued above, only five countries –
namely - Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles, Uganda and
Zimbabwe have submitted their National Impact Assessment
(NIA) studies. Indications are that the rest of the
countries need at least two months to finalise their
studies assuming that all the logistical problems, particularly
the finalisation of the terms of reference and the disbursement
of funds receive urgent attention. This development
has profound impact on sequencing of negotiating positions
of the configuration. Despite this major setback, which
is largely of the EU making, the newly established Regional
Preparatory Task Force (RPTF) during its July meeting
went on to prioritise fisheries, development issues
and market access for the period July 2004 and March
2005 . The RPTF is an informal body of experts, which
allows each side to get better technical understanding
of the other side’s position so as to smoothen
negotiations. This illustrates why the ESA configuration
process, if not checked, may result in a bad deal. Interestingly
it was reported that even the European Commission (EC)
felt the need to further discuss how to prepare discussions
and negotiations in each cluster in detail bearing the
need to focus on region’s integration efforts
. Some delegates wondered why already agreeing to sequence
cluster negotiations when NIA studies are yet to be
completed as well as wondered who prioritises the sequencing
of cluster negotiations. “We are hearing this
for the first time. …,” remarked the Zambian
delegation. Agriculture is at the pinnacle of negotiations
under the Doha Development Agenda, and such, should
be treated with the importance it deserves. This prompted
others to wonder why agriculture, which is also the
backbone of many ESA economies is not being prioritised?
This emerged again as a potential area not only to confuse
the process, but may also create divisions within the
configuration, a development that may result in a bad
EPA outcome. In addition, one of the Ambassadors argued
that RPTF should be more organised for the EU could
not wait for ESA to prepare its positions. A critical
reflection of this leads to the question “why
are our ambassadors eager to negotiate when the capitals
are not ready?” All these developments leave one
pondering, “who is really in charge of this process?”
Is this another repeat of the fisheries cluster?
A review of the roadmap allows ESA member-states to
build markets first for themselves, a development that
cements the South – South trade cooperation leading
to stronger economic ties and deeper regional economic
integration. This is a political leverage, which ESA
can use to slow down the process with the view to adequately
prepare itself for an “EPA” with a human
face that will address the needs of the people. Only
if ESA players proceed with this route can the EPA process
minimise negative implications to the economies and
the socio-political ramifications to its citizens. A
focus on South-South first will also enable the process
to take care of specific situations of island member-states
as well as issues of competitiveness and proper sequencing
of clusters as advised by studies. Failure to heed this
may lead to frustration, as EU is likely to adopt a
near abroad strategy, which invariably benefits its
new member-states than the ESA region.
The process now seems to be firmly under the directions
of the COMESA secretariat and Ambassadors in Brussels
with governments and private sector to some extent guessing
what to do. Other non-state actors – civil society,
media and MPs are still restricted to the periphery
of engagement. This is despite the South African and
Egyptian experiences, which were shared to the participants
in Entebbe and Antananarivo, respectively. In Entebbe,
ESA was advised to effectively use the civic bodies
in this process both at the national and regional levels.
Similarly in Antananarivo, the Egyptian Ambassador presented
some lessons including:
• The complexity of the process which resulted
in 40 rounds of negotiations and 10 draft position documents
that were concluded after four and half years. The lesson
for ESA is to ensure more time is needed in order to
reach some agreements within the configuration so as
to aim for a win-win situation;
• ESA should refuse political conditionalities
on any particular issue, which may end-up compromising
the process. It is thus imperative for the configuration
to clearly define and understand its defensive and offensive
interests;
• ESA was reminded that negotiating with such
a powerful economic block is very difficult, and thus
it becomes imperative to identify certain issues, which
are not subject to negotiations. In difficult situations,
it is even beneficial to the configuration to suspend
the negotiations as a strategy to refocus the process;
• It is imperative to have one chief negotiator
supported by different cluster negotiators with adequate
backing from the capitals. It is also imperative for
ESA to prepare adequately for these negotiations while
at the same time ensuring good relationships between
and/or among Brussels, Geneva, capitals, COMESA and
ACP Secretariat. In this way, ESA should always follow
up issues as well as coordinate various efforts employed
in this process. It is also imperative for the configuration
to understand one another. In addition, the configuration
should intensify training courses for negotiators as
well as blending this with experience;
• ESA should ensure that the transitional period
of opening up their industries to EU products is not
too short, a development that protects jobs while avoiding
social unrest and political instability. In the same
vein, ESA should ensure that the process adequately
address the supply-side constraints currently inhibiting
ESA member-states from enjoying the EU market;
• ESA to ensure that adequate provisions of financial
support are guaranteed in the new trade pact well before
reaching the final agreement; and
• ESA should ensure that the rules of the origin
are identical across the region as well as monitoring
the gap between exports and imports between ESA and
EU. This indicates the direction of benefits and losses
to the configuration. Other issues to consider include
safe guards measures and non-trade barriers.
It is important for ESA therefore to understand that
it is dealing with a very strong, powerful, united and
more integrated region, which is already aware of its
defensive and offensive interests. Moreover, ESA economies
are vertically linked to the EU and for centuries have
remained providers of raw materials and consumers of
their finished goods. All this suggests taking into
account the political dynamics of this process, which
unfortunately is missing at the moment. It also suggests
a strong spirit of consulting and involving widely.
Is ESA process going to achieve a common goal? It is
important to note that unity of purpose which is largely
a product of proper coordination between and/or among
capitals, ambassadors and regional secretariat; clear
roles and respect of governments as the main driving
force in the process; wide consultations and involvement
of all non-state actors; and slowing the process if
ESA toolbox is lacking vital instruments such as studies.
Only if the above is obtained will ESA become firm and
well focused to negotiate an EPA as a formidable force.
Most economic policies and paradigms including trade
regimes (both bilateral and multilateral) in the past
have failed to extricate ESA economies from the colonial
economic bondage that has continued to subject its citizens
to abject poverty.
Marine Fisheries Framework Agreement
The Dedicated Session on Fisheries attended by ESA
coastal or island member-states on the 15th October
in Madagascar agreed on a compromise on Marine Fisheries
Rules of Origin. This gave birth to the final version
of the Marine Fisheries Framework Agreement, ready to
be used by those countries wishing to negotiate a national
Fisheries Framework Agreement with the EU . “The
Marine Fisheries Framework Agreement is available in
both English and French”, the COMESA secretariat
informed the participants.
While this framework excluded the ESA inland countries,
the new agenda also excluded the ‘inland fisheries’
their only hope to ensure that the process in this cluster
addresses the interests of all member-states of this
configuration. This exclusion did not go well with such
countries like Zimbabwe, which had come well prepared,
with all the intellectual support to engage on this
issue. “Mr Chairman, my delegation strongly urged
the meeting to bring back the inland fisheries back
on the agenda because we have already brought an expert
on fisheries to lead us in engaging this meeting,”
the leader of the Zimbabwean delegation said. Subsequently,
Malawi and Zimbabwe presented a paper entitled “The
need for inland fisheries industry to form an effective
and reciprocal trade between ESA and EU” which
then formed the basis for discussing this issue. However,
the above development left some participants wondering
as to who between the ESA governments and the COMESA
secretariat is driving the negotiating process. Rightly
so, the Ugandan delegation during the plenary session
queried why the COMESA Secretariat seemed to be creating
some ‘green rooms’ in this process. “Already
Mr Chairman, the coastal countries have developed and
agreed on the fisheries agreement framework while the
inland fisheries studies are still underway,”
remarked the leader of the Ugandan delegation. What
is more worrying so far in this process is the emerging
divisions on arriving at an ESA-EPA cluster outcome
within a month of substantive preparations to negotiate
as a block with the powerful EU partner. This illustrates
ESA’s failure to consult and involve widely all
key stakeholders, particularly civil society, media
and members of parliament (MP) in the process. Adequate
checks and balances are thus crucial to avoid such a
dual development of positions. Even the African-Caribbean-Pacific
(ACP) delegate advised that ESA should not hurry to
negotiate and sign any cluster positions, for once signed,
it becomes very difficult to get out of it.
The RNF meeting then agreed to hold the Dedicated Session
on inland fisheries in January 2005 in Malawi. It is
thus hoped that the progress of this meeting will give
indications and directions as to when the common position
on fisheries cluster between the marine and inland countries
would merge. Until then, it remains a guess to some
religious followers of this process if the outcome of
the inland fisheries will have any bearing (positive
or negative) of the new Marine Fisheries Framework Agreement.
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