There is much debate on the African continent on the right kind and right level of regionalism, or the creation of regional blocs. Earlier discussion on it (in 1960s, 70s, and 80s) was focused on internal regionalism. Kwame Nkrumah had the vision, in the 1950s, of a single united Africa. Many people in the continent still share that vision. Pragmatic leaders, such as Julius Nyerere preferred a phased approach to African unity starting from sub-regional blocs to continental unity. He had even offered to delay Tanganyika’s independence if that allowed time for Uganda and Kenya to catch up so that the three countries achieved independence as one nation. This was not to be. But the strategy of creating sub-regional blocs as stepping stones to continental unity has remained the major thrust of policy and institutional action in the 1970s and 1980s, leading to formation of groups such as the SADC in Southern Africa, ECOWAS in West Africa and the East African Community (EAC).

Overlapping these efforts at regional organisations have been the leftover arrangements from the colonial era. Thus, for example, the countries of francophonie are “integrated” with the economy of France, and Anglophone countries are members of the Commonwealth. These “partnership” arrangements have consolidated into the present Cotonou Agreement that has brought together practically the whole of the continent into closer “integration” or “partnership” with Europe.

There are contradictions between the endogenously-inspired regional efforts (such as SADC and ECOWAS) and the exogenously-inspired “partnership” agreements such as Cotonou. The biggest hurdle to indigenous regionalisation is the “regionalism” pushed from above by the dominant economic and power blocs in the name of “partnership”. In order to understand the implications of these contending regionalisms, and to clarify issues for policy directions, it is necessary to distinguish between different types of regional and partnership arrangements.

Four Types of Regionalism/Partnerships

The first is integrative regionalism, or integrative partnership. It is one where the integrating partners are perceived to have compatible interests. No conflict is perceived, or if there are conflicts then these are “sublimated” by the higher consideration of the common good that comes out of integrating into a single economic or political unit. The East African Community (EAC) that existed prior to independence of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania was a kind of integrative regionalism (possible because of the common imperial interest of the British). To some extent, the European Union is tortuously moving in the direction of this kind of integrative regionalism.

However, once the gains and losses are closely tabulated and calculated, and no state surrenders anything unless it gets something in return of equal value, it is distributive regionalism or partnership. Here the states continue to pursue their individualistic interests. There is no overriding common interest except those that are negotiated on the basis of the relative strength of the negotiating partners. Examples of this are the South African Customs Union, and the bilateral trade negotiations that go on between countries of the southern African region either within the context of the SADC or COMESA. Thus, in the case of the EAC, when the three countries became independent and resorted to analysing the distributive gains and losses, and in the absence of an overriding integrative mechanism, it collapsed -- an eventuality Mwalimu Nyerere tried unsuccessfully to avoid by offering to delay Tanzania’s independence until Kenya and Uganda were ready to achieve independence. (The EAC is beginning to take shape again, but the Cotonou and other forms of enforced “partnerships” based on divide and rule are a powerful barrier).

Then there is enforced regionalism or partnership where one country is subjected to the dictate of another largely because of asymmetrical power relationship. Theoretically, there is the possibility of the weaker partner to walk out of the arrangement. Practically, this may be impossible because of a “locked-in” situation where walking out may be even more costly than a bad bargain. Classically, the colonial relationship was an enforced regionalism. The colonised people put up resistance but they had little choice in the ensuing outcome. Enforced regionalism is power-based.

A sub-set of enforced partnership is structured regionalism/partnership where the outcome is determined not by negotiations but by historically created conditions or institutions in which asymmetry is built into, embedded in, the very nature of that relationship. It is a structured relationship. Thus, for example, in the decades when the Europeans colonised Africa it was an enforced partnership that was yet to be structured. Once the institutions of industry, trade and governance were put in place, the relationship became institutionally structured. The structured relationship may include not only institutions but also social groups (that emerge in the process of production and trade), modes of thought, and even a certain kind of psychology (dependent psychology), that the imperial power creates within the colonised society.

The ACP-EU Partnership Agreement, signed in Cotonou in June 2000, is an example of structured regionalism. It is essentially the continuation of the historic relationship between Africa and Europe. Nothing has fundamentally changed about this relationship. In the “Free Trade Agreements” (FTA) that are signed by the EU and the African countries, the latter continue by and large to perform the historic role of the producers of raw materials for European industries, as well as provide markets for European goods and investments. Indeed, with the inclusion of “comprehensive and integrated approach for a strengthened partnership based on political dialogue, development co-operation and economic and trade relations" in the Cotonou Agreement, the structured relationship has, if anything, deepened and intensified even further. These are backed by sanctions that only Europe can impose on the ACP countries (the reverse case of Africa imposing sanctions on Europe is out of the question).

The US’ African Growth Opportunities Act (AGOA) is an example of an enforced regionalism that has yet not become structured. It is a unilateral, fast-track, offer by the United States to open its market to African products provided the qualifying countries undertake to meet certain U.S. economic, political and military conditions (among them the following: market access to US is open only to those countries that secure a "certificate of eligibility" from the US; conform to the WTO and Structural Adjustment Programmes; bring domestic legislation to conform to the WTO; eliminate barriers to all US trade & investments; and ensure strict private property legislation and enforcement. Furthermore, they must not engage in any act that undermines US national security and foreign policy interests). The offer is in obvious competition with the EU, and has yielded immediate economic results for a few African countries. However, the US can unilaterally withdraw the offer any time, and there is nothing an African country can do about it.
Conclusion: Peoples' regionalism - regionalism from below

It is hardly necessary to make the case for regional integration. The economic case based on market size and the benefits of large scale production is obvious enough.
The one argument above all else that must be reiterated here is the political one. The political argument is that only through regional integration can the populations of the region acquire a negotiating clout in the global production and trading system. There is no country in Africa, not even South Africa, which has the capacity and the strength to leverage the negotiations that take place, for example, in the WTO or under the Cotonou Agreement.

It should be clear from the above analysis what kind of regionalism is best suited to Africa. Integrative regionalism, however, cannot be achieved overnight. The main reason is that African countries are locked into enforced regionalism/partnerships with the former colonial countries. The second reason is that amongst themselves, African countries tend to negotiate on the basis of gains and losses for their respective countries (distributive regionalism). As noted earlier, this is the reason that the East African Community disintegrated after Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania gained their independence separately.

In the southern African context integrative regionalisation can be achieved only from below, and as an act of faith, a leap into the future through sublimating considerations of short term commercial gains and losses. Indeed, it is not such a leap in the dark as the above sentence might suggest. There is no question that the present structured and enforced regionalism from on top by the EU and the USA are working against the interests of the bulk of the populations. They have everything to gain by making this leap into the future, and by demanding of their political leadership that they systematically disengage their countries from an enforced relationship with the imperial countries, and make serious efforts at integrative regionalism.